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EXPANDING THE FEDERAL  
COMMON LAW?: FROM NOMOS  
& PHYSIS AND BEYOND 
SAM KALEN* 
The Supreme Court’s decision in AEP v. Connecticut, as well as litigation 
involving the threat posed by Asian Carp, reflect an emerging trend of 
testing the federal judiciary’s willingness to expand the federal common 
law to include claims for interstate environmental threats.  There is an 
assumption, including by the Supreme Court, that a federal common law 
for public nuisance exists, and that the pressing question is whether to 
expand that common law.  This article challenges that assumption.  The 
article illustrates that the widely shared view about the persistence of a 
federal common law for interstate pollution overlooks the Supreme 
Court’s formulation of its original jurisdiction.  The article briefly 
explores the evolution of the jurisprudential basis for the common law, 
how the common law and custom became inextricably tied to eighteenth 
and nineteenth century enlightenment principles, and how those ideas 
shaped the growth of and demise of a general federal common law.  The 
Article then examines how and why the interstate pollution cases reflect 
the Court’s struggle with the scope of its constitutionally assigned original 
jurisdiction to decide disputes between states on the basis of law and 
equity, not on the basis of any federal common law theory.  The final part 
of the Article explores considerations animating any meaningful dialogue 
about whether to employ a federal common law for harms such as 
interstate pollution.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
No just government ever did, nor probably ever can, exist, 
without an unwritten or common law.  By the common law, is 
meant those maxims, principles, and forms of judicial 
proceeding, which have no written law to prescribe or warrant 
them, but which, founded on the laws of nature and the dictates 
of reason, have, by usage and custom, become interwoven with 
the written laws; and, by such incorporation, form a part of the 
municipal code of each state or nation, which has emerged from 
the loose and erratic habits of savage life, to civilization, order, 
and a government of law.1 
Searching for order in a world full of flux, lawyers and jurists grope 
for ideas, intellectual constructs, which allow for change while providing 
the illusion of continuity.2  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes told us that 
the lawyers’ job is that of prediction,3 but the task of prediction requires 
continuity between the past and the present, and between the present 
and the future.  The nature of progress, however, raises important and 
interesting questions concerning the relationship between continuity 
and change.4  Specifically, to what degree do legal actors develop, 
modify, or adopt ideas that accommodate such facially irreconcilable 
concepts as change and continuity?  How do members in the legal 
profession speak of “legal certainty” if progress requires that the law 
exist in a state of flux? 
These questions lie subtly beneath escalating efforts to test whether 
a federal common law should apply to complex interstate environmental 
harms.5  After all, the common law operates against the background of 
our existing regulatory state.  And when our existing environmental 
programs appear ill equipped to tackle complex environmental threats, 
the common law serves as a potentially viable solution for advocates 
concerned with protecting threatened resources.  “The common law,” as 
 
1. Ohio v. Lafferty, Tapp. Rep. 113, 114 (Ohio 1817). 
2. “[I]n the evolution of habit, custom and tradition in the field of politics there is a 
more or less constant interplay between the forces of continuity and change.”  BURLEIGH 
CUSHING RODICK, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM: A FORGOTTEN FACTOR IN THE 
FOUNDING 132 (1953). 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897). 
4. The idea of progress is itself relative.  See J.B. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN 
INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 352 (1932); ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS 4–5 (1980). 
5. See infra notes 23–24, 26 and accompanying text. 
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Robert Percival explains, “now serves primarily as a backstop to be 
invoked when regulation fails, but common law concepts retain a 
powerful influence on judges distrustful of regulatory agencies.”6  
Absent the common law, the only alternative is to secure a political 
solution through legislation.  But in our present age of increased 
partisanship and attendant legislative gridlock at the national and 
occasionally state level, political solutions appear problematic.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, scholars and advocates increasingly focus 
attention on the flexibility of the common law to adapt and respond to 
modern threats. Jason Czarnezki and Mark Thomsen, for instance, 
argue for a “rebirth of the environmental common law.”7  Others 
suggest that, with the advent of scientifically proven methods for tracing 
pollutants, the common law offers increasing promise to address 
regulatory gaps in our modern environmental programs.8 
The viability of pursuing federal common law clams is one aspect of 
this growing conversation.  During the early 1990s, when the Federal 
Courts Section of the Association of American Law Schools addressed 
the question of federal common law, the issue arguably appeared 
somewhat academic.9  But today, as we struggle to find solutions to 
modern, complex environmental threats that transcend political 
boundaries, the need for some nationally uniform standard seems 
apparent.10  Federal common law claims naturally become attractive 
 
6. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 28 (2007).  
7. Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental 
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); see also Stephen M. Johnson, From 
Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public 
Law Failures?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 575–94 (2011) (surveying recent common law 
actions brought in response to climate change and natural disaster). 
8. E.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 87–88 (6th ed. 2009). 
9. George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private 
Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 229–30 (1992). 
10. For articles addressing transboundary pollution, see generally Noah D. Hall, 
Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate Environmental Impact 
Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49 (2008); Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate 
Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 155 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 931 (1997); Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal 
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004); A. Dan Tarlock, The Law 
of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 
(1985). 
10 KALEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:23 PM 
2012] FROM NOMOS & PHYSIS AND BEYOND 521 
options against a background of congressional inaction.  Some scholars 
advocate that federal courts, like state courts, ought to have expansive 
power to “create” law—fashion a federal common law.11  And then there 
are those who argue otherwise.12  This debate is evident—and 
increasingly relevant—in the effort to secure a federal common law of 
public nuisance for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.13  While, at least 
for now, the Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut held that such claims, if they exist, would otherwise be 
displaced by the Clean Air Act (CAA), it repeated a now frequent 
refrain that some limited federal common law claims are possible.14  In 
another prominent case, the Seventh Circuit decidedly left open the 
possibility that states might be able to use federal common law to sue 
the United States for allowing an invasive species into the Great Lakes 
region.15 
Employing the common law to address emerging environmental 
threats assuredly might be a means for achieving legitimate ends—ends 
that we must achieve if we are to attain some level of sustainability, 
whether in connection with invasive species or rising greenhouse gas 
emissions.  If, however, law “does the bidding of those whose hands are 
on the controls,” and consequently “reflect[s] the goals and policies of 
those who call the tune,”16 then whether law as announced by judges is 
an appropriate means to address modern environmental threats is worth 
exploring.  But whether such means are themselves appropriate is 
missing from the current dialogue. 
Instead, two fundamental premises support the “rebirth of the 
common law.”  The initial premise is that the legislative and executive 
branches are not adequately addressing modern environmental threats.  
 
11. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 884 (1986); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 
805, 805 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Federal Common Law]; Louise Weinberg, The 
Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW. 
U. L. REV. 860, 861–62 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act].  Others favoring 
a federal common law emphasize the problems attendant with forum shopping and 
procedural rules.  See, e.g., Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the 
Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314–16 (1980). 
12. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: 
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 4 (1991). 
13. See infra Part II.A. 
14. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
15. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2011).  
16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 14 (1973).        
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True enough; however, legislative action, at least at the national level, 
historically occurs only when a sufficient consensus coalesces around the 
need for immediate action to respond to discrete, readily observable 
problems.  And in advance of that occurring, it is a normative judgment 
about whether the legal system must respond to those threats.  The 
second largely ignored premise is that courts are capable, 
constitutionally, institutionally, and professionally of employing a 
common, or customary law—a “law” somehow tied to the past and yet 
capable of expanding to address new problems. While it may be 
utilitarian to urge an expanded common law, we ought to ensure first 
that the means—that is, the common law and particularly a federal 
common law—is an appropriate or efficacious tool for social change. 
After all, the common law assumes that past, or customary practice, 
provides some defensible, respectable, and reasonably predictive guide 
for defining current or future rights and responsibilities between parties.  
Yet, paying homage to custom necessarily embodies some normative 
judgment.  For most of our history, that normative judgment was an 
acceptance of—and allegiance to—the notion of shared values: custom 
reflected universal truths.  That made sense in a pre-modern world, 
where jurists assumed human nature was universal.  Few today accept 
this.  “A major feature of the outlook against which the classical social 
theorists rebelled was the notion that there is a universal human nature, 
common to all men, regardless of their place in history.”17  And to the 
extent any particular custom arguably reflects a shared community value 
or vision, the custom can be as arbitrary as it might be rational.  We see 
this on the international level, where customary law can conflict with 
modern sensibilities.18  A good example of how custom can emerge with 
 
17. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A 
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 5 (1976). 
18. See Magaya v. Magaya, 1999 (1) ZLR 100, 104–05 (S) (gender equality conflicting 
with African customary law); Ephraim v. Pastory, (2001) AHRLR 236, 3 (TzHC 1990) 
(conflict between general equality and customary law).  In Ephraim, Justice Mwalusanya 
opined,  
[H]owever much this court may sympathise [sic] with these very natural sentiments 
[against gender discrimination] it is cases of this nature bound by the Customary law 
applicable to these matters.  It has frequently been said that it is not for courts to 
overrule customary law.  Any variations in such law as takes place must be 
variations initiated by the altering customs of the community where they originate. 
Ephraim, (2001) AHRLR at 237 (quoting Bi Verdiana Kyabuje and Others v. Gregory s/o 
Kyabuje (1968) HCD no. 459).  Yet, relatedly, in the international arena, codifying 
international customary principles might unwittingly “entrench schisms in the law along 
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little appreciation for its modern relevance goes something like this: In 
ancient times, houses of worship were built with small doors, possibly as 
a consequence of the smaller height of many of the congregants.  But 
even with smaller doors, congregants still had to bow when entering the 
holy sanctuary.  While the average height of congregants increased over 
the centuries, the doors on these religious buildings were enlarged; the 
congregants, however, still bowed.  Why?  They believed it was 
tradition: A custom to be followed because it had been done that way 
for centuries. 
This article, therefore, attempts to prompt a searching dialogue 
about the jurisprudential basis for promoting an expanded federal 
common law.  Is there a custom? What is the basis for it?  And if so, is 
there a principled rationale for applying it to new circumstances?  This 
dialogue is both timely and necessary; the prevailing discussion assumes 
the existence of a general federal common law for interstate pollution 
without considering the relationship between past and present.  This 
omission is evident in the cases discussed in Part I, and it infects the 
present exploration into the use of an expanded federal common law.  
Parts II and III illustrate that the prevailing conception of federal 
common law for interstate pollution buries history, that continuity with 
the past.  In particular, Part II briefly explores the evolution of the 
jurisprudential basis for the common law, and how the common law and 
custom became inextricably tied to eighteenth and nineteenth century 
enlightenment principles, and how those ideas shaped the growth of and 
demise of a general federal common law.  Part III, then, examines how 
and why the interstate pollution cases reflect the Court’s struggle with 
the scope of its constitutionally assigned original jurisdiction to decide 
disputes between states on the basis of law and equity, not on the basis 
of any federal common law theory.  This critical appreciation for history 
does not necessarily suggest that the present effort to expand the federal 
common law is inappropriate, only that it requires considering—apart 
from the past—whether it is jurisprudentially appropriate to do so.  Part 
IV, therefore, offers suggestions for that consideration, and Part V 
concludes that perhaps the time is ripe for accepting the challenge to 
balance the desire for change with the need for continuity. 
 
regional or ideological lines.”  Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 
1001–02 (2012). 
10 KALEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:23 PM 
524 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:517 
II. GROWING INTEREST IN THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
As we confront multi-jurisdictional environmental threats not 
addressed adequately by existing environmental programs, the pressure 
mounts for exploring common law remedies—particularly with a 
gridlocked political system.19  Two recent cases, in particular, exemplify 
prominent attempts to persuade the federal judiciary that not only is 
there a federal common law of public nuisance, but that it ought to be 
expanded.  In American Electric Power Co.  v. Connecticut and 
Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, both the Supreme 
Court and the Seventh Circuit accepted a general federal common law 
of public nuisance for interstate pollution, and in both cases the parties 
pressed the judiciary to expand that law to suit new circumstances.20  
And in each instance, the court left open the possibility of expanding the 
doctrine.  Unfortunately, as explained in Parts II through IV, they did so 
without any apparent appreciation for how or why the Court 
entertained past lawsuits that today we cite as evidence of a federal 
common law of public nuisance. 
A. Addressing Rising Greenhouse Gases 
In recent years, the viability of having federal courts apply federal 
common law has emerged as a possible venue for forcing large-scale 
GHG emitters to reduce their emissions.  When congressional interest 
in responding to the threat of climate change began to wane, scholarly 
commentary encouraging the use of a federal public nuisance claim 
intensified.21  And during the past few years, three principal GHG 
 
19. Louise Weinberg, for instance, commented several years ago: 
If Congress is in gridlock, must that disable the Supreme Court from rationalizing 
mass disaster litigation?  The inaction of Congress in the face of so much proposed 
legislation says very little about national policy, save that powerful minorities are 
likely to be aligned on each side.  Unlike legislatures, courts can attempt to strike 
policy balances on a case-by-case basis, feeling their way toward lines of responsive 
authority. 
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 11, at 845. 
20. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011).  
21. E.g., Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: 
Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 
40 CONN. L. REV. 591 (2007); Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice 
Movement: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197 (2010); Daniel A. 
Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605 (2007); 
Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Exploring 
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common law cases surfaced.22  Comer v. Murphy Oil, for instance, 
focused primarily on state common law.23  It involved the devastation 
following hurricane Katrina, with Mississippi homeowners alleging that 
but for the rising GHG emissions the degree and intensity of the storms 
off the Coast would not have occurred.24  Next, residents of the village of 
Kivalina, Alaska, alleged that rising GHG emissions contributed to 
rising sea levels, forcing residents of the small village to relocate.25  And 
finally, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the State of 
Connecticut and others alleged that some of the largest electric utility 
GHG emitters were liable under a federal common law public nuisance 
theory for the emissions.26 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. has 
 
Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2009); David A. Grossman, 
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Litigating Global Warming: Substantive Law in 
Search of a Forum, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill, Global 
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP 
v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447 (2012); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, 
Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2005); cf. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: 
The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010); 
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and the Need 
for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009).  But see Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the 
Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 
(2012). 
22. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527; Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
No. 09-17490, 2012 WL 4215921 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 
F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); see also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 
WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept 17, 2007) (dismissing GHG case against car manufacturers).  For 
a survey of climate change litigation cases, see David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical 
Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate 
Change  Litigation  in  the  United  States,  40  ENVTL.  L.  REP.  10,644  (2010);  and  Jason 
Scott Johnston & Heidi M. Hurd, Debate, Climate Change and the Courts, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 33 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ClimateChange.pdf 
(debating whether, in light of Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, GHG emissions should be 
subject to a public nuisance tort).  
23. Comer, 585 F.3d. at 870. 
24. Id. at 859; see Katherine A. Guarino, Note, The Power of One: Citizen Suits in the 
Fight Against Global Warming, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 125, 143 (2011) (describing the 
plaintiffs’ theory of the case). 
25. Kivalina, 2012 WL 4215921, at *1. 
26. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532. 
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since eclipsed the other cases.27  In the case, the plaintiffs invoked the 
common law against some of the country’s largest GHG emitters.28  
Collectively, the defendants, four private utilities and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), allegedly emit approximately 650 million tons 
of GHGs, accounting for roughly 25% of emissions from the domestic 
electric power sector.29  “Plaintiffs sought [injunctive] relief under the 
federal common law of public nuisance or, in the alternative if federal 
claims were not available, under the state common law of public 
nuisance.”30  The Second Circuit held that the complaint stated a valid 
federal common law nuisance claim.31  In requesting certiorari, the 
companies argued that “[t]he threat of such litigation and the 
indeterminate exposure to monetary and injunctive relief that it entails 
will substantially impede and alter the future investment decisions and 
employment levels of all affected industries, and ultimately every sector 
of the economy.”32 
The Court decided the case on narrow grounds, holding that “the 
Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal 
common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from 
fossil-fuel fired power plants.”33  In doing so, however, the Court 
observed that its past cases allowed federal common law suits for a 
public nuisance, citing Missouri v. Illinois,34 New Jersey v. City of New 
York,35 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,36 and two lawsuits37 between 
 
27. Kivalina, 2012 WL 4215921, at *4.  In Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. establishes that the Clean Air Act displaces 
such claims.  Id. at *6. 
28. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533–34. 
29. Id. at 2534.   
30. Brief for Respondents Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and the City of New York at 5, Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174); 
see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (“[T]he plaintiffs asserted . . . [a] violation of 
the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or, in the alternative, of state tort law.”). 
31. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 353 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
32. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-
174).   
33. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
34. Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
35. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
36. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916). 
37. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
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Illinois and Milwaukee.38  And while adding that the common law adapts 
to new circumstances and science, the Court observed that it has “not 
yet decided whether private citizens . . . may invoke the federal common 
law of nuisance to abate out-of-state pollution.”39  But the Ninth Circuit 
recently interpreted the Court’s approach in American Electric Power 
Co., as confirming that the “federal common law includes the general 
subject of environmental law and specifically includes ambient or 
interstate air and water pollution,” and that a federal common law 
doctrine of public nuisance “can apply to transboundary pollution 
suits.”40 
B. Protecting Against Invasive Species 
Michigan’s reliance on federal common law represents a similar 
effort to test how far federal common law might adapt to new 
circumstances.  Seeking to prevent an alleged influx of Asian carp into 
Lake Michigan, the five Great Lakes region states of Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Minnesota (collectively “the “States”), as 
trustees of the water and aquatic resources and as parens patriae on 
behalf of their citizens, brought suit against the United States over the 
operation of the Chicago Area Waterway System (“CAWS”).41  The 
 
38. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535–36. 
39. Id. at 2536.  The Court expressed hesitancy about creating “controlling law,” 
although it quoted approvingly Justice Jackson’s comment that courts can fashion federal 
common law.  Id. at 2536–37.  But Jackson’s comments in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC., 
referred to a lawsuit brought by a federal corporation under a specific federal statute that 
lacked any direction on what law to apply.  315 U.S. 447, 455, 472 (1942).  And the D’Oench 
Court relied upon Deitrick v. Greaney, which involved national banks and a federal question.  
Id. at 456 (citing Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940)).  In Deitrick, the Court indicated 
that the federal statute left it to “judicial determination . . . to be derived from it and the 
federal policy which it has adopted.”  Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 201. 
40. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 09-17490, 2012 WL 4215921, at *3 
(9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2012). 
41. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2011).  The 
“more than 70 miles” of canals in the CAWS resolved Chicago’s long-standing problem with 
contaminated water supplies, by, inter alia, altering the hydrology of the region and allowing 
water to flow from Lake Michigan into the Mississippi River Basin.  Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 8, Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d 765 (No. 10-3891).  The Chicago Sanitary and 
Ship Canal, completed in 1900, connected Lake Michigan with the Mississippi drainage basin, 
and is now operated and maintained by the Corps pursuant to congressional directives.  See 
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-88, § 107, 95 Stat. 
1135 (1981); Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-63, Tit. I, Ch. IV, 97 Stat. 
311.  The CAWS, as a consequence, created several opportunities for fish and other biota to 
move into Lake Michigan.  See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief para. 25, 
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States’ complaint charged that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and created a federal 
common law public nuisance, by allowing non-native (invasive) species 
of carp (the bighead and silver) to enter the Great Lakes through the 
CAWS.42  Federal and state resource agencies agreed that invasive 
species posed a threat to the region.  In 2007, Congress even directed 
that the Corps prepare a feasibility analysis of options for addressing 
invasive species in the Great Lakes and Mississippi River Basin region.43  
Concerned that the Corps was not adequately responding to the threat 
of invasive carp species, the States, since 2009, “repeatedly urged the 
Defendants to promptly take additional, comprehensive action to 
minimize the risk that Asian carp will migrate through the CAWS into 
Lake Michigan.”44 
Initially, in December 2009, the State of Michigan attempted to 
compel a Corps response by seeking to reopen and amend a decree in 
the Supreme Court’s Original Nos. 1, 2 and 3 proceedings, or in the 
 
Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d 765 (No. 10-3891) (“[T]he diversion project, the CAWS and 
associated infrastructure as created, maintained, and operated by the District and the Corps 
provide a conduit for the movement of fish and other biota between the Illinois River and the 
Great Lakes at multiple locations on the shore of Lake Michigan.”). 
42. The plaintiffs asserted federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (between plaintiff states and the Illinois unit of 
government), and both jurisdiction and relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702.  Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 41, para. 2. 
43. Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (“2007 WRDA”), Pub. L. No. 110-114, 
§ 3061(d), 121 Stat. 1121; see also District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 108-335, § 345, 118 Stat. 1352 (2004); Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-662, § 1135, 100 Stat. 4251.  In 2009, Congress granted the Corps certain emergency 
authority for invasive species, until Oct. 28, 2010, later extended.  Energy and Water 
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-85, § 126, 
123 Stat. 2853 (2009).  
44. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 41, para. 59.  A summer 
2012 report warned that it is likely that Asian carp will enter Lake Michigan through the 
Chicago waterway system absent affirmative barriers.  Becky Cudmore et al., Binational 
Ecological Risk Assessment of the Bigheaded Carps (Hypophthalmichthys spp.) for the Great 
Lakes Basin, 2011/114 CAN. SCI. ADVISORY SECRETARIAT 7–11, 19.  For information about 
multi-jurisdictional efforts and studies by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, see U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, GREAT LAKES AND MISSISSIPPI RIVER INTERBASIN STUDY REPORT: 
MOVING AHEAD FOR PROGRESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ACT SECTION 1538(B)(5) OF 
PUBLIC LAW 112-141, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS (Oct. 3, 2012).  See generally 
EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ASIAN CARP AND THE 
GREAT LAKES REGION (April 15, 2011) (describing the history through 2011). 
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alternative file a new original jurisdiction action.45  In 1967, the Supreme 
Court issued a decree in Wisconsin v. Illinois, establishing limits on the 
amount of water that Illinois can divert from Lake Michigan.46  The 
United States opposed Michigan’s efforts, arguing that the only 
appropriate forum would be an APA-type case in federal district court, 
assuming the presence of a final agency action.47  Soon thereafter, the 
Asian Carp Regional Coordinating Committee, which includes the 
federal agencies, issued framework reports; the coordinating committee 
rejected Michigan’s suggestion of temporarily closing locks and sluice 
gates and deferring until 2012 any decision on a long-term solution.48  
On June 3, 2010, the Corps then released its Interim III, Modified 
Structures and Operations, Chicago Area Waterways Risk Reduction 
Study and Integrated Environmental Assessment.49  This Interim III 
 
45. Motion to Reopen and for a Supplemental Decree, Petition, and Brief and Appendix 
in Support of Motion, Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d 765 (No. 10-3891).  The Supreme Court 
twice denied preliminary injunctive motions by Michigan.  See Gabriel Nelson, Supreme 
Court Again Rejects Injunction in Asian Carp Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/22/22greenwire-supreme-court-again-rejects-injunctio
n-in-asia-55113.html. 
46. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967).  Chicago has been diverting water from 
Lake Michigan since the 1920’s.  Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 399–401 (1929); see also 
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 423 (1925).  The Court limited the 
diversions exclusive of domestic purposes and required reporting on the progress of 
constructing sewerage treatment facilities.  Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 201–02 (1930); 
see Wisconsin v. Illinois, 311 U.S. 107, 110–11 (1940); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 352 U.S. 945 
(1956); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); see also Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 847, 46 Stat. 
929. 
47. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 13, Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d 765 (No. 
10-3891).  The United States explained that, while actions among states and the United States 
are subject to concurrent original jurisdiction in the Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (2006), the 
Court exercises jurisdiction in such cases sparingly; the Government further argued that 
reopener provisions in existing decrees cannot expand the scope of the issues that were 
originally before the Court, and that the appropriate approach is to seek leave of the Court to 
initiate a new original jurisdiction action.  Id. at 16–21.  Here, such an original jurisdiction 
action lacked any opposing state, according to the United States, because the Water District, 
and not Illinois, is the defendant along with the Corps.  Id. at 23–28. 
48. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 41, para. 59–60.  Some 
temporary closures did occur, such as the closure of a 2.5-mile segment to allow the 
application of rotenone poisoning, with a subsequent public statement that no invasive carp 
species were among the fish killed.  Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 19, Michigan v. Corps,  667 F.3d 765 (No. 10-3891).  
49. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DISPERSAL BARRIER EFFICACY STUDY: INTERIM 
III—MODIFIED STRUCTURES AND OPERATIONS, ILLINOIS & CHICAGO AREA WATERWAYS 
RISK REDUCTION STUDY AND INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 25 (2010) 
[hereinafter INTERIM III REPORT]; Lynne Whelan, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs Releases 
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report, suggesting the need for additional testing and monitoring, 
arguably downplays any potential imminent threat.50 
The States then filed their APA and federal common law complaint 
in federal district court.51  The United States principally argued that no 
reviewable final agency action existed, and that the only “tort” based 
remedy would be under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), not 
under a federal common law theory, and that the FTCA did not allow 
the issuance of equitable relief—here, the requested mandatory 
preliminary injunction.52  The States presented the court with volumes of 
information, testimony, and argument, and the district court judge 
decided that the States had failed to overcome the high burden 
necessary to warrant issuing either a preliminary or permanent 
mandatory injunction.53  The court assumed that a final agency action 
existed, and concluded that little suggested that the agency had acted 
“wrong,” “much less arbitrary and capricious[ly].”54  And, although the 
court agreed with the States that the APA waives sovereign immunity 
even for non-APA cases, including the State’s common law claim,55 
Judge Dow concluded that the States failed to present sufficient 
evidence that the United States had created a public nuisance56—an 
“unreasonable interference with a common public right.”57  But Judge 
 
Interim Report III & IIIA, ASIAN CARP REGIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (June 3, 
2010), http://www.asiancarp.us/news/usaceiiireport.htm.   
50. INTERIM III REPORT, supra note 49, at 51.  The Corps reaffirmed its Interim III 
report on June 8, 2010, when responding to a letter from the States.  Complaint for Injunctive 
and Declaratory Relief, supra note 41, para. 76.  This and other public statements led the 
States to conclude that the Corps was proposing “no change in operation” of the system 
regarding lock operations.  Id. para. 80.  
51. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 41, para. 2.  See 
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10CV4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at *14 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 2, 2010).  U.S. District Court Judge Robert Dow, Jr., noted that the States filed the case 
“on the heels of . . . Michigan’s unsuccessful bid to persuade the Supreme Court . . . to address 
the subject matter of this dispute.”  Id. at *1 n.1. 
52. Id. at *16. The Government argued that the FTCA is the only waiver of sovereignty 
applicable to the State’s complaint, and the FTCA limits relief to monetary damages.  Id.  The 
States countered that the APA (5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)) waived sovereign immunity.  Id.  
53. Id. at *34. 
54. Id. at *15. 
55. Id. at *16–17 (relying principally upon Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 371–72 
(7th Cir. 2008); Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2006); and United States v. City 
of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
56. Id. at *34. 
57. Id. at *20. 
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Dow signaled, with sufficient evidence, that he did not believe that any 
federal statute had displaced the common law claim.58 
The Seventh Circuit expressed reservations about the district court’s 
assessment of the facts, and as such was “less sanguine about the 
prospects of keeping the carp at bay,” but nonetheless concluded that 
the requested injunction was premature.59  The court accepted that 
states may sue under federal common law for the abatement of 
interstate pollution, echoing the long-standing rationale that “[i]t is our 
federal system that creates the need for a federal common law to govern 
interstate disputes over nuisances.”60  And interstate pollution includes, 
according to the court, a wide range of areas and effects, including 
environmental and economic impacts from invasive species.61  The 
principal question, therefore, is whether such suits are actionable against 
the United States.62  The court assumed they were—noting what it 
believed were good arguments for both sides—and then proceeded to 
address whether the United States had waived its sovereign immunity, 
or regardless, if federal statutory law had displaced any federal common 
law claim.63  The court first agreed with the lower court that the APA 
waives sovereign immunity for non-monetary claims, even those claims 
that are not brought under the judicial review provisions of the APA.64  
 
58. Id. at *18–20. 
59. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
60. Id. at 770 (invoking Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)). 
61. Id. at 771.  The States, and subsequently the court, invoked the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS section 821(B)(1) and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee as the basis for the 
underlying federal common law public nuisance tort.  See Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d at 780–
81 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979)); 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 41, at 25–26. 
62. Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d at 773–74.  The court noted Judge Kavanaugh’s 
observation, from the D. C. Circuit, that “the Court has not endorsed any federal common-
law causes of action against the Government during the post-Erie period.”  Id. at 773 (quoting 
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring)).   
63. Id. at 774–80. 
64. Id. at 775; Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *16 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 2 2010).  In addition to the cases relied upon by the lower court, see supra note 55, 
the Seventh Circuit relied upon Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d at 774.  But the relevant portion from Shinseki 
involved a constitutional issue, with the plaintiff veteran group arguing that the Veteran 
Affairs Administration violated veterans’ due process rights by not providing adequate and 
swift enough mental health care guaranteed by statute.  Shinseki, 644 F.3d at 850.  The United 
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It then rejected any suggestion that the FTCA somehow shields tort-
based non-monetary relief cases against the United States.65 
II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW: FROM SWIFT TO 
ERIE 
What seems striking about the Court’s language in American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, and understandable and yet quite 
extraordinary about the issues left unresolved in Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, is that the law surrounding a federal common law 
for interstate pollution has evolved with minimal analysis or discussion, 
and, more importantly, it has become severed from its roots.  This seems 
odd for two reasons.  First, the history surrounding the federal common 
law is quite torturous.  During the early Republic, the possibility of a 
federal common law became entangled in discussions about the general 
role and efficacy of the common law.66  Whether or how a federal 
common law could exist necessarily depended upon how jurists 
conceived of the common law in the first place.67  And as the country 
grew older, so too our conception of law matured to a degree that a 
federal common law made less sense.68  Second, the cases today we 
associate with the rise, decline and lingering vestiges of a federal 
common law are anything but that.  Instead, as explained in Part III, 
those cases demonstrate the Court’s struggle with the scope of its 
original jurisdiction, and the application of equity principles—not 
common law doctrines. 
To begin with, the common law morally, religiously, scientifically, 
and jurisprudentially, made sense to many of the leading jurists during 
the period surrounding the revolutionary war, up to at least the mid- to 
 
States, there, did not even argue sovereign immunity for the constitutional claim, and the 
Ninth Circuit capitalized on the opportunity to assert that the APA’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity did not necessarily only apply to reviewable final agency actions under the APA.  
Id. at 864–65. 
65. Michigan v. Corps, 667 F.3d at 776.  The fight to avert the Asian carp continues, and 
the Wisconsin State Journal recently urged that Wisconsin “keep fighting in court and in 
Congress to stop the Asian carp from reaching the Great Lakes.”  Editorial, Keep Fighting 
to Stop Asian Carp, WIS. STATE J., July 9, 2012, http://host.madison.com/news/opinion/editori
al/article_cd9ba094-c7bb-11e1-8cd4-0019bb2963f4.html. 
66. See infra notes 74–105 and accompanying text.  
67. See infra notes 80–93 and accompanying text.  
68. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.  
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late-nineteenth century.69  The common law as it emerged in this country 
enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the dominant natural law theory 
of the time.70  Sir Isaac Newton’s scientific discoveries in physics 
portrayed a mechanistic universe: Through observation we could glean 
fixed principles.71  We could observe human behavior—customary 
human practices, and through reason deduce from these practices rules 
governing human relationships that, to many at the time, reflected some 
divine providence or plan.72  The northeast Unitarians, in particular, 
 
69. See infra notes 81–82, 90 and accompanying text.  
70. Natural law “was conceived of as a collection of principles that, while universally 
subscribed to, had not been codified, and for this reason it was regularly contrasted with 
‘positive’ . . . law.”  G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–1835, in 
3–4 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 676–77 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) [hereinafter G. 
Edward White, Marshall Court]. 
71. See J. BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADITION: FROM LEONARDO TO HEGEL 200 (1960) (identifying “a Newtonian world which 
moved in mathematical regularity, like a ‘great Clockwork’”).  Cynthia Russett explains 
Newton’s influence: 
Mechanism reigned in philosophy and politics, economics and ethics.  Newtonian 
physics was the first great instance of science as a paradigm, i.e., when not only the 
method but the very substance of science spills over into the humanities.  On a 
cosmic scale, Newton’s achievement promoted a conception of the universe as a 
great machine operating in accordance with certain specified laws.  At a lower level, 
it suggested that men and societies could similarly be interpreted as acting under 
fixed laws. 
CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, DARWIN IN AMERICA: THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE 1865–
1912, 18 (1976); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 58–59 (1955) (noting the influence of Newton).  The 
positivist Auguste Comte embraced such a mechanical analogy in his SYSTÈME DE 
PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE OU TRAITÉ DE SOCIOLOGIE (Paris 1854).  Francis Bacon too further 
promoted how such a mechanistic approach could produce a science of law, by suggesting that 
observation—a level of empiricism—could distill patterns of human behavior—or custom 
worth protecting or promoting through the common law.  See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF 
THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 159 (1965) 
[hereinafter MILLER, LIFE MIND] (noting the contribution of Bacon).  See generally DANIEL 
R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON (1992) (discussing Bacon’s legal theory).  And John 
Locke incorporated this scientific paradigm by suggesting that knowledge could be discovered 
through experience.  See BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra, at 200.  
72. Even to the American Philosophical Society, science served a utilitarian purpose of 
revealing some divine plan upon which human society could better adjust its rules.  See 
HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 216–17 (1976) (“[I]t was assumed that 
any discovery of the workings of nature, even any particular fact, from a new plant to 
mastodon bones or Indian customs, was bound to prove useful to man—that was how all 
nature had been framed.”).  In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, for instance, Justice Story wrote 
that the Constitution “was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, 
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embraced a theology that, following John Locke, allowed them to 
discern through reason and revelation a divine plan, and support 
utilitarian legal or moral rules that merged with facilitating the 
tendencies of human behavior—custom.73 
Of course, while notions of fundamental, higher, and natural law 
pervaded legal, political, and philosophical discourse during the pre- and 
post-revolutionary period,74 legal positivism emerged simultaneously 
with pockets of hostility toward the common law—an English 
institutional remnant.75  And so, alongside common law advocates were 
 
but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the 
inscrutable purposes of Providence.”  14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816). 
73. See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE UNITARIAN CONSCIENCE: HARVARD 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 1805–1861, at 2–8, 55–92 (1970) (discussing the northeast Unitarian 
world view); ROBERT LEET PATTERSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM ELLERY 
CHANNING 183–254 (1952) (examining how Locke influenced the views of Unitarianism’s 
foremost nineteenth century preacher with respect to the relation between reason and 
revelation). 
74. See MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 239–65; see also CHARLES GROVE 
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 78–79 (1930); A.E. DICK HOWARD, 
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 
261 (1968); MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 208–09, 241; GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 260 (1969); BENJAMIN FLETCHER 
WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1–12 (1931); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of 
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152–53 (1928); Stewart Jay, Origins of 
Federal Common Law, 133 U. PA. L . REV. 1003, 1010 (1985).  See generally Thomas C. Grey, 
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) (investigating the unwritten constitution that formed the status 
quo in the period surrounding the revolution).  For a discussion about how natural law theory 
became bundled in the framers’ approach toward law and the constitution, see MORTON 
WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).  Samuel 
Puffendorf, cited by many during this period, provided a natural law foundation for law, at 
least as it then related to international law and the law of nations.  David Hoffman’s textbook 
for law students at the time observed that “[t]he pages of Puffendorf, and of Wolf, or at least 
those of Rutherforth and of Burlamaqui, are presumed to be familiar to the student, before 
he takes up the works which treat of the law of nations.”  2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF 
LEGAL STUDY 451 (Balt., Joseph Neal 2d ed. 1836).  Hoffman also instructed students about 
Vattel, although warning about his “novel and untenable positions,” as well as others such as 
Selden, Grotius, and Bynkershoek.  Id. at 453, 467. 
75. Perry Miller aptly opines “the profession had to contend, in the post Revolutionary 
years, with a deep hostility among the people to the whole conception of the Common Law, 
which patriots now identified with British tyranny and with Tory endeavors . . . .”  PERRY 
MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 17 
(1962) [hereinafter MILLER, LEGAL MIND].  Gordon Wood too observes how codification 
responded to the hostility toward judges exercising too much discretion, although recognizing 
the softening of this hostility over time.  GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A 
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those who favored codification.76  Even Justice Joseph Story, one of the 
leading jurists in the Nineteenth Century, “could marshal all the 
arguments against the inutility of a code, but then ask the still-persistent 
question: ‘Because we cannot form a perfect system, does it follow that 
we are to do nothing?’”77  And Story promoted incorporating civil law 
concepts into American jurisprudence.78  Another pre-Civil War scholar, 
Theodore Sedgwick, echoed Justice Story, when he explained how both 
the common law and limited codification coalesced to address the needs 
of a changing society: the slow process of custom establishes general 
rules over time, while codification responds immediately and uniformly 
to present demands.79 
Indeed, both Justice Joseph Story and the eminent Chancellor James 
Kent promoted the republic’s common law heritage.80  Both jurists clung 
 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 402–03, 406–07 (2009); see also id. at 430–
31 (describing tension between codification and common law).  For a review of early 
codification efforts, see CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A 
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981) (noting that it was not necessarily a 
movement but an attempt to address legal development); George M. Hezel, The Influence of 
Bentham’s Philosophy of Law on the Early Nineteenth Century Codification Movement in the 
United States, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 253 (1973) (discussing three primary antebellum lawyers’ 
views); and Roscoe Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 AM. 
L. REV. 676, 681–82 (1914) (noting public dissatisfaction with lawyers and the common law 
following the American Revolution). 
76. See MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 239–65. 
77. Id. at 254; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 6 (Melville E. Bigelow ed., Bos., Little, 
Brown, & Co., 13th ed. 1886) (“It is impossible that any code, however minute and particular, 
should embrace or provide for the infinite variety of human affairs, or should furnish rules 
applicable to all of them.”). 
78. “Story was optimistic about the prospects for a large infusion of civilian principles 
into America.”  Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 
52 VA. L. REV. 403, 418 (1966).  Story’s writings constantly allude to the merits of civil law 
doctrines.  E.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH 
OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW (Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839); JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE 
CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (Cambridge, Hilliard & Brown 1832).  The Justice’s view on 
riparian water rights, for instance, incorporated French civil law.  See Samuel C. Weil, Waters: 
American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135 (1919). 
79. See MILLER, LEGAL MIND, supra note 75, at 296–306.  Sedgwick apparently 
distinguished Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), when he further suggested “that there 
can be no common law of the Union,” and such law could exist “only by legislative adoption.”  
MILLER, LEGAL MIND, supra note 78, at 302. 
80. The colonies “received” the English common law, and often explicitly did so in 
legislation and typically with caveats.  See generally PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH 
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tenaciously to a static system, often favoring vested forms of older 
common law property rights over dynamic, entrepreneurial forms of 
property.81 Chancellor Kent, for instance, believed that jurists do not 
make law, but rather follow the law—that is, the common law.82  And 
when describing the prohibition against marriage among lineal 
descendants, Chancellor Kent expressed how natural law provided a 
reasoned approach for deducing ex ante legal principles: 
That such a marriage is criminal and void by the law of nature, is 
a point universally conceded.  And, by the law of nature, I 
 
COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES (Da Capo Press 1970) (1899) (on file 
with author) (providing a sociological treatment of colonial attitudes toward the English 
common law); Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United 
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951) (describing the legal processes by which states and 
territories adopted the common law); William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common 
Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1968) (examining the 
American colonies’ reception of the English common law); see also ELLEN HOLMES 
PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
11–30 (2011) (discussing post-revolutionary period attitudes toward the common law).  David 
Hoffman, a prominent figure in post-Revolutionary America, also promoted the common 
law, believing that, through methodological rigor, law as a science legitimated legal principles.  
MILLER, LEGAL MIND, supra note 75, at 83–84; see also MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, 
at 159, 182–83. 
81. Both jurists, for instance, expressed fear that property rights had been undermined 
by Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
420 (1837).  MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 221.  In Charles River Bridge, the Court—
over Justice Story’s objection—favored dynamic over static property rights.  See STANLEY I. 
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 
172–79 (1971) (providing comprehensive treatment of Charles River Bridge); see also G. 
Edward White, Marshall Court, supra note 70, at 595 (“Story treated the principle of 
protection for vested property against legislative interference as settled and self-
evident . . . .”).  Chancellor Kent’s rigid devotion to vested property rights led him to oppose 
universal suffrage.  See MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 231.  Kent undoubtedly was 
influenced by Adam Smith and, while tethered to tradition, promoted rules favoring 
commercial expansion.  See Joseph Dorfman, Chancellor Kent and the Developing American 
Economy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1290, 1291–92 (1961).  For a glimpse of how these two jurists 
approached legal reasoning differently, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Debating the 
Transformation of American Law: James Kent, Joseph Story, and the Legacy of the 
Revolution, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ 1 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009). 
82. MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 235–36.  Kent, a diest, infused his captivation 
of the common law with a universal religious sanction, id. at 194, and was an intellectually 
formidable leader during his era.  See MAY, supra note 72, at 233–34.  Ellen Pearson suggests 
that, to Chancellor Kent and others, “taking the common law out of American law would 
have been like taking the English language away from Americans.”  PEARSON, supra note 80, 
at 200. 
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understand those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator 
has prescribed to man, as a dependent and social being; and 
which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason, 
though they may be more precisely known, and more explicitly 
declared by divine revelation.83 
But Justice Story more than Chancellor Kent is now principally 
associated with the promotion of a federal common law.  After all, 
Story’s opinion in Swift v. Tyson suggested that federal courts could 
apply a general common law.84  While early in his tenure as a Justice, 
Story deftly avoided whether the United States, as a sovereign, adopted 
the common law, he did “contend, that when once an authority is 
lawfully given, the nature and extent of that authority, and the mode, in 
which it shall be exercised, must be regulated by the rules of the 
common law.”85  Story added “it can hardly be doubted, that the 
constitution and laws of the United States are predicated upon the 
existence of the common law.”86  When Story determined that a 
universal general principle of the common law applied, he expressed 
considerable trepidation about altering it: 
I do not sit here to revise the general judgments of the common 
law, or to establish new doctrines, merely because they seem to 
me more convenient or equitable.  My duty is to administer the 
law as I find it; and I have not the rashness to attempt more than 
this humble discharge of duty.87 
 
83. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 348 (N.Y. Ch. 1820).  Justice Story agreed 
with the Chancellor’s observations.  See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, 
AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND 
JUDGMENTS 176 (Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 2d ed. 1841). 
84. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). 
85. United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), 
rev’d, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816). 
86. Id.  “In my judgment, nothing is more clear, than that the interpretation and exercise 
of the vested jurisdiction of the courts of the United States must, in the absence of positive 
law, be governed exclusively by the common law.”  Id. at 620. 
87. Conyers v. Ennis, 6 F. Cas. 377, 377 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 3,149).  In Conyers, Story 
expressed reservations about the doctrine he felt compelled to apply, but observed that “[i]t is 
sufficient for me to stand upon the law, as it is now universally received.  If there are public 
mischiefs growing out of its principles, let them be remedied by the legislature.”  Id. at 378.  
Story often copiously explored whether certain doctrines were, indeed, universally accepted 
and the reasons behind those doctrines.  See, e.g., Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 
371 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8,269).  In Crowninshield the court noted, 
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And while not categorically opposed to replacing aspects of the 
common law with codification (favoring it in the areas of criminal law, 
property, personal rights, and contracts),88 Justice Story believed that 
aspects of law should “continually expand[] with the progress of 
society, . . . adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, and 
commerce, and the mechanic arts, and the exigencies and usages of the 
country.”89 
Yet it was Story’s devotion to natural law that shaped his 
understanding of the common law.  Each of the principal scholars 
examining Story’s jurisprudence explain that, while Story embraced a 
measure of utilitarianism justifying “making law” when appropriate, he 
nonetheless believed in a natural law.90  To Justice Story, the “law of 
 
I do not sit here to consider, what in theory ought to be the true doctrines of the law, 
following them out upon principles of philosophy and juridical reasoning.  My 
humbler and safer duty is to administer the law as I find it, and to follow in the path 
of authority, where it is clearly defined, even though that path may have been 
explored by guides, in whose judgment the most implicit confidence might not have 
been originally reposed. 
Id.  
88. See MILLER, LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 251. 
89. JOSEPH STORY, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698, 702 (William W. Story ed., Bos., Charles C. Little & James 
Brown 1852).  Justice Story remarked that the common law sprung from the “dark and 
mysterious elements of the feudal system.” JOSEPH STORY, Autobiography, in THE 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra, at 1, 19.  But he championed the 
common law, and arguably its flexibility.  In one of his classic statements, he observed “[t]he 
common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America.  Our 
ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they 
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.”  
Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829). 
90. See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A 
STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT 68 n.33, 73–77 (1971); R. KENT NEWMYER, 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 113, 213 
(1985) [hereinafter NEWMYER, OLD REPUBLIC]; see also Morgan D. Dowd, Justice Joseph 
Story: A Study of the Legal Philosophy of a Jeffersonian Judge, 18 VAND. L. REV. 643, 643, 
661–62 (1965).  Another biography of Justice Story is GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH 
STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1970).  Many antebellum jurists were well 
acquainted with the moral philosopher William Paley, who championed the intersection of 
religion with a high dose of utilitarianism.  “Actions are right or wrong,” he wrote, “according 
to their tendency. . . .  It is the utility of any moral rule that constitutes its obligation.”  
B. JUDD, PALEY’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY, ABRIDGED & ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION, 
LAWS, AND USAGES, OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23–24 (N.Y.C., Collins & 
Hannay 1828); see MAY, supra note 72, at 342.  Henry May, however, posits, arguably too 
broadly, “Paley’s careful demonstrations of the prudential uses of Christianity were too 
utilitarian for American moral taste.  Americans wanted to believe at once in social and even 
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nature” is the “first step in the science of jurisprudence.  The law of 
nature is nothing more than those rules which human reason deduces 
from the various relations of man . . . .”91  As one of the northeast 
Unitarians,92 Story invoked natural law often, occasionally indirectly by 
referring to natural justice, and believed that through reason and 
revelation certain rules or principles—neither temporally nor 
geographically limited—would reveal themselves.93  
Consequently, the debate over the ability of federal courts to employ 
the common law encompassed a variety of jurisprudential, practical and 
political issues. Early cases reflected the inherent difficulty in applying 
an English common law, particularly a federal common law, in the new 
country.94  As Stewart Jay observes, “There was no coherent concept in 
 
scientific progress and in unchanging moral principles.”  Id. at 342. 
91. JOSEPH STORY, Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 89, at 503, 533. 
92. See HOWE, supra note 73, at 9–10; MCCLELLAN, supra note 90, at 21 n.72 (indicating 
that Story was “head of the Unitarian Association” in 1832); see also JOSEPH STORY, History 
and Influence of the Puritans, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra 
note 89, at 408, 441. 
93. Consistent with many during his era, Story had confidence in human reason, and 
believed that reason and revelation were interconnected.  STORY, supra note 92, at 408, 442; 
STORY, supra note 91, at 513.  This translated into a belief that certain rules transcend 
political boundaries, such as equity principles.  STORY, supra note 91, at 540.  In his treatise 
on bailments, for example, Story observed that commercial transactions can hardly reflect the 
rules of any particular country, and they may “be deemed to be founded upon, and to 
embody, the usages of merchants in different commercial countries, and the general 
principles . . . as to the rights, duties, and obligations, of the parties, deducible from those 
usages, and from the principles of natural law applicable thereto.”  JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, FOREIGN AND INLAND, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM 
THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE NATIONS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE 25 (Bos., Charles C. 
Little & James Brown 1843).  Pothier’s influential treatise on partnerships echoed this 
understanding, proclaiming that partnerships reflected principles of natural justice—in effect, 
the law of nations.  POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIPS 4 (Owen 
Davies Tudor trans., London, Butterworths 1854).  Blackstone too had merged natural law 
and revelation.  See KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA, 1790–1900, at 58 (2011) (“All law, for Blackstone, was grounded in a law of nature 
‘co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself.’  This law was superior to all human law 
and could occasionally be uncovered by the law of revelation.”).  And it is well accepted that 
“the lawyers and judges and teachers of the formative era found their creating and organizing 
idea in the theory of natural law.”  ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN 
LAW 12 (1938); see also PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE 
CONSTITUTION, LAW AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 67 (1975) (identifying that the 
legal thinkers “demonstrated the apparent identity between common and natural law”). 
94. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) (“All those laws of 
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the early nineteenth century of ‘federal common law’ as we now make 
use of that expression.”95  Assuredly, however, many of the leading 
jurists during this period supported a federal common law.96  In 
Chisholm v. Georgia, for instance, Justice Iredell reviewed the common 
law as a guide for applying Congress’ directive in Section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act, which authorized the federal courts to issue writs “which 
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”97  And Iredell’s 
canvassing of the common law (noting at one point that it was consonant 
 
the parent country, whether rules of the common law, or early English statutes . . . —not 
being adapted to the circumstances of our colonial condition—were not adopted, used or 
approved, and therefore do not come within the description of the laws adopted and 
confirmed by the provision of the constitution . . . .”); MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 16–17 (1992) (examining “the 
struggle between late nineteenth-century legal orthodoxy, often called ‘Classical Legal 
Thought,’ and ‘Progressive Legal Thought’”); see also sources cited infra note 100 (discussing 
the federal common law of crimes).  
95. Jay, supra note 74, at 1010. 
96. Id. at 1016; see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY: 1789–1821, at 433 (1922).  While the eminent Charles Haines observes, 
“Marshall differed from most of his Federalist brethren in holding that the courts of the 
United States had no common law jurisdiction,” Haines only caveats his observation by 
suggesting that Marshall “adopted an attitude of subservience to the common law in 
interpreting the words of the Constitution relating to treason.”  CHARLES GROVE HAINES, 
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789–
1835, at 285 (1944).  Focusing on Marshall’s approach toward treason, particularly in 
connection with the trial of Aaron Burr, ignores too many factors to illustrate Marshall’s 
attitude toward the common law.  See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF 
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1835, at 130–31 (1997).  It also overlooks that the Constitution 
makes treason a constitutional, not a common law crime. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.  
Others suggest that Marshall embraced the Blackstonian approach of merging a common law 
background with a progressive and reformist approach.  See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN 
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 346 (2001) [hereinafter 
NEWMYER, HEROIC AGE] (suggesting Marshall merged common law and common sense); 
NEWMYER, OLD REPUBLIC, supra note 90, at 101 (suggesting Marshall disclaimed federal 
criminal common law); THOMAS C. SHEVORY, JOHN MARSHALL’S LAW: INTERPRETATION, 
IDEOLOGY, AND INTEREST 15–16, 117 (1994) (“Marshall drew on the common law tradition 
of legal discourse to interpret two contradictory threads into constitutional law.”).  And 
Marshall’s later acquiescence to preventing a federal common law of crime may simply reflect 
his aversion to separate opinions rather than acceptance of the conclusion.  See BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND 
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 238 (2008).  Jay suggests that Marshall rejected 
the notion that the common law could justify an assertion of federal jurisdiction, but it could 
be used once a federal court otherwise exercised ex ante jurisdiction.  Jay, supra note 74, at 
1087–88, 1273, 1331. 
97. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433–34 (1793). 
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with natural law) led him to conclude that nothing in the “old law” 
authorized the type of suit.98  Of course, in Calder v. Bull, Justice Iredell 
opposed deploying natural justice as a guide for decision-making.99 
The now classic instance where the common law clashed with a 
positivistic approach toward law occurred in the context of deciding 
whether federal courts could punish for common law crimes.100  The 
common law, after all, had become a Federalist tool for suppressing 
speech antagonistic to emerging republican principles, particularly 
against the supporters of Thomas Jefferson.101  Bruce Ackerman notes, 
“for Jefferson himself, the common law aspiration of the judiciary was 
the single most obnoxious feature of the Federalist program.”102  Some 
Federalists, such as Justice Chase, accepted that the United States 
lacked any common law.103  Others, including the first Chief Justice 
Oliver Ellsworth, defended a federal common law for crimes.104  William 
 
98. Id. at 442, 449–50. 
99. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798).  Justice Iredell’s views changed 
during the course of his career, however.  Jay, supra note 74, at 1041. 
100. See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, at 16 (1985); Jay, supra note 74, at 
1017.  See generally Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 267 (1986); Stephen B. Presser, The Supra-Constitution, the Courts, and the Federal 
Common Law of Crimes: Some Comments on Palmer and Preyer, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 325 
(1986); Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the 
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223 (1986); Gary D. 
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian 
Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992).  
101. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN 
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 14 (1971); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 77–80 (2008); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF 
A FREE PRESS 274, 292–94 (1985); JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND 
SEDITION ACTS 72–85 (1951); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN 
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 419–23 (1956).  “Certainly most 
Federalists expected the federal judiciary to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction, 
including that of the common law of crimes.”  WOOD, supra note 75, at 411. 
102. ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 236.  Madison too opposed a federal common law.  
Id.  Stewart Jay acutely warns, “[u]nderstanding the early relationship between the common 
law and the federal government involves an exercise in constitutional history . . . .”  Jay, supra 
note 74, at 1030. 
103. United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394–95 (1798).  “Besides, what is the 
common law to which we are referred?  Is it the common law entire, as it exists in England; or 
modified as it exists in some of the States; and of the various modifications, which are we to 
select, the system of Georgia or New Hampshire, of Pennsylvania or Connecticut?”  Id. at 
395; see also Jay, supra note 74, at 1067–69, 1072. 
104. See G. Edward White, Marshall Court, supra note 70, at 120–21. 
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Rawle, for instance, argued that the federal courts could employ the 
common law to punish offenses that were unlikely to be prosecuted in 
any state court.105 
When the Court ceremoniously abandoned permitting any federal 
common law for crimes, it did so without recognizing the extant debate.  
In United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, Justice Johnson began by noting 
that the issue had “long since [been] settled in public opinion.”106  But 
the precedent was not so clear; the case “swept aside a number of lower 
federal court precedents and reversed a general acceptance of the 
prosecution of common-law crimes in federal courts” and “subordinated 
common law to constitutional principle.”107  Justice Story, for one, 
disagreed with Hudson & Goodwin.  Four years after the decision, Story 
twice noted his objection: first in passing in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,108 
and then in United States v. Coolidge.109  Justice Washington later 
observed that federal courts would not apply a federal common (civil or 
 
105. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 257–65 (Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829); see also Jay, supra note 74, at 1050, 
1082, 1280–81.  A contemporary examination of the common law in federal courts is PETER S. 
DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila., Abraham Small 1824). 
106. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).  Premised on 
principles of state sovereignty and separation of powers, the opinion, according to Jay, 
“refut[ed] a supposed contention of the Federalists: that federal courts possessed a 
jurisdiction akin to the common-law courts of England—a connotation that would have 
entirely displaced the independent authority of the states.”  Jay, supra note 74, at 1241. 
107. JOHNSON, supra note 96, at 141; see also Rowe, supra note 100.  G. Edward White 
aptly summarizes the issue when he notes that the possibility of a federal common law for 
crime was “connected to the politics of extensive or limited jurisdiction for the federal courts 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”  1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 231 (2012) 
[hereinafter G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY]. 
108. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) (referring to a federal 
court’s ability to hear criminal cases when matters of national rights or national policy were 
involved). 
109. United States v. Coolidge, 1 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); see ACKERMAN, supra 
note 96, at 239 (noting that Story’s opinion in Coolidge “claimed that the Constitution 
presupposed the common law”).  In Coolidge, the Court followed Hudson & Goodwin, 
although Justices Story, Washington, and Livingston all expressed interest in revisiting the 
issue.  Coolidge, 1 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 416.  Justice Story assiduously believed that a federal 
criminal common law was necessary to protect the federal government.  See Jay, supra note 
74, at 1294–1300; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 107, 
at 232 (discussing Coolidge).  Justice Story, later with the aid of Chief Justice Marshall and 
Justice Washington, drafted for Congress what became the Crimes Act of 1825, designed to 
protect the “peace and dignity of the United States.”  Id. at 232. 
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criminal) law under the Hudson & Goodwin decision, although the 
matter was “open for discussion” should the appropriate case arise.110  
That never occurred.111 
What occurred instead is that Justice Story solidified a federal civil 
general law for roughly the next century.  To begin with, Justice Story 
distinguished between federal jurisdiction to hear a case and the 
governing substantive rules, if the Constitution or Congress assigned 
jurisdiction to the federal bench.112  The Court addressed that distinction 
in Swift v. Tyson, in the context of “mercantile” law perceived of at the 
time as embodying national or international principles rather than local 
ones.113  The case involved a complicated transaction, infected by 
fraudulent activity, and the ability of a creditor to recover on a 
negotiable instrument regardless of the facts surrounding the history of 
the instrument.114  Negotiable instruments had become a critical element 
in the domestic and international mercantile system, and yet uncertainty 
surrounded the law governing commercial transactions.115  Did, for 
instance, the holder of a negotiable instrument received in exchange for 
a pre-existing debt hold an enforceable instrument?116  The English 
common law suggested no, the eminent English jurist Lord Mansfield 
suggested yes, and the New York courts were ambiguous.117  Similarly, 
would an instrument tainted by prior fraudulent activity be 
 
110. United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 475 (1826). 
111. See generally TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE 
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 33 (1981) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall avoided 
addressing the doctrine of a federal common law).  Freyer explains that most of the leading 
contemporary commentators, including Peter DuPonceau, St. George Tucker, William 
Rawle, and Thomas Sergeant, distinguished between “local” matters and “commercial” 
matters governed by the law merchant.   Id. at 34–35. 
112. See G. Edward White, Marshall Court, supra note 70, at 494 (describing 
distinction).  White explains, “[J]urists at the time of the Marshall Court were vitally 
concerned about the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts . . . .”  Id. at 113.  This 
distinction resonated with Chief Justice Marshall, and even more ardent Federalists: It 
followed that, if the federal judiciary was afforded jurisdiction, the scope of its jurisdiction 
should be coextensive with Congress.  Id. at 564.  The converse also applied: If the federal 
judiciary had few limits on what it could address under the auspices of the common law, the 
same would be true for Congress.  Id. at 124. 
113. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).   
114. See FREYER, supra note 111, at 6. 
115. Id. at 6–9. 
116. See id. at 10. 
117. Id. at 10–11. 
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enforceable?118  When, therefore, Swift sued Tysen in the Southern 
District of New York, and Tysen’s attorney attempted to show that 
Swift had procured the instrument through fraud and was not a bona 
fide creditor, the question eventually surfaced of whether New York law 
applied under Section 24 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.119  After bouncing 
back and forth from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court, the Court 
accepted the case in 1841 and decided it the following year.120 
Justice Story treated the matter as if little doubt existed about “the 
law,” indicating early in his opinion that some principles are “so 
essential to the security of negotiable paper, that it is laid up among the 
fundamentals of the law, and requires no authority or reasoning to be 
now brought in its support.”121  And he then dismissed the suggestion 
that Section 24 of the Judiciary Act somehow applied to common law 
decisions on matters not of a local concern: Commercial law, or the law 
merchant, he reasoned is not dependent upon local usages but rather on 
“general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”122  Tony 
Freyer amply demonstrates that Story’s opinion in Swift reflected a 
widely accepted distinction between local and general law: general law 
being a part of the law merchant governed by the law of nations rather 
than local law or municipal law.123  This general commercial law, 
moreover, “was based on the notion that unwritten law was something 
to be discovered and was merely evidenced by judicial opinions.”124 
Swift not only benefited the emerging new economy in the post-Civil 
War era, it seemed compatible with the sentiment of law as a science, 
 
118. Id.  
119. Id. at 13.  The Court likely misspelled the defendant’s name, George W. Tysen.  Id. 
at 166 n.9.  For articles on Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see William A. Fletcher, The 
General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine 
Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984); and Charles Warren, New Light on the History of 
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1924). 
120. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); FREYER, supra note 111, at 11–13. 
121. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 15–16. 
122. Id. at 19. 
123. FREYER, supra note 111, at 35–36; see also Charles A. Heckman, The Relationship 
of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century and the Federal 
System, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 246, 247–49 (1973) (explaining that Story distinguished local 
from general law and the latter formed part of the merchant law, which in turn was governed 
by the law of nations).  Newmyer similarly observes that Swift “was generally compatible with 
the prevailing assumptions of law at the time it was given.”  NEWMYER, OLD REPUBLIC, 
supra note 90, at 336. 
124. Jay, supra note 74, at 1266. 
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which flourished in the legal academy throughout the fourth quarter of 
the nineteenth century—and later.  As lawyers, we are all too familiar 
with the Langdellian case method, developed by Harvard law professor 
Christopher Langdell.  Langdell believed law operates as a science, with 
principles or doctrines governing human relations (in the common law) 
capable of being discerned through carefully culling judicial opinions.125  
The “law” according to Langdell, was as much a science as physics, 
chemistry, biology, or geography.126  Implicit in this approach is the 
assumption that one immutable rule of law exists, empirically verified by 
searching analysis of printed materials: In other words, a “brooding 
omnipresence in the sky” that, through the careful review of cases would 
become exposed.127  This assumption fit nicely with the doctrine in Swift: 
a scientifically derived and nationally uniform principle (custom) could 
be divined, at least in areas of the law deemed necessary to promote a 
national market.  And Swift v. Tyson is where Justice Story proclaimed 
that “[cases] are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and are 
not of themselves law.”128  In short, cases could reflect a higher, 
 
125. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN 
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 55–78 (1994); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 51–72 (1983); WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN 
AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 94 (1998); M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from 
Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 119–20 (1986).  Langdell unfortunately never 
adequately expressed what he meant by law as a science.  See RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR 
LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870–1930, at 29 
(1987).  Nor did he explain how “law” could accommodate change if doctrines remain static. 
Id. at 31.  Langdell’s alleged scientific approach has provoked harsh personal critics, such as 
Grant Gilmore.  GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977).  Others are 
subtler than Gilmore.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT 
HISTORY 167 (2002) (describing Langdell’s method of “pretension to science and rigor”).  
For a defense of Langdell, see Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: 
Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345, 345–47 (2007). 
126. Langdell’s method paralleled the newly emerging paradigm created by Charles 
Darwin’s Origin of Species.  Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The 
Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 27 (1980). For 
both Darwin and Langdell, the process involved observation and then the rule.  Id.  Marcia 
Speziale, therefore, suggests that, “[i]f he was not the very first legal realist, Christopher 
Langdell must at least be seen as the bridge from formalism to what came later in American 
legal theory.”  Id. at 3–4.  While the “source” for what would be examined to determine 
“custom” might have shifted to reported decisions and away from those sources that earlier 
jurists and scholars relied upon, the Newtonian/Baconian paradigm remained inherent in the 
Langdellian case method.  Id. at 27–28 
127. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
128. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).   
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scientifically derivable, common or customary law.  Under such a 
system, continuity with the past purported to offer certainty for the 
future. 
Ironically, as the case-method gained ascendency, the rise of the 
social sciences and concomitant late-nineteenth century intellectualism 
shattered aspects of the formalism inherent in his method.  American 
intellectuals, in the words of Morton White, revolted against formalism, 
“since they had been convinced that logic, abstraction, deduction, 
mathematics, and mechanics were inadequate to social research and 
incapable of containing the rich, moving, living current of social life.”129  
The new social scientists, as strident empiricists, rejected the past as 
inhibiting change.  Dorothy Ross chronicles how “realism” came to 
embody a sense that the present differed from the past, warranting 
reexamining tradition and possibly developing new institutions capable 
of responding to modern human society.130  And at the risk of 
oversimplification, the anti-formalism and emerging social sciences 
undermined law as a static system, facilitated divorcing law from 
religion and morality, promoted examining law empirically in its 
historical and evolutionary context, and sanctioned the use of law as a 
 
129. MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST 
FORMALISM 11 (1957); see also MORTON WHITE, PRAGMATISM AND THE AMERICAN MIND: 
ESSAYS AND REVIEWS IN PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 41–42 (1973).  One of 
the best studies of this period, including its relationship to law, is EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF 
VALUE (1973); see also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century 
American Legal Thought—A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About 
Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 882 (1981).  The ostensible formalism of late 
nineteenth century judicial rhetoric is well documented.  See generally GILMORE, supra note 
125, at 10 (“American law has, from its late eighteenth-century beginnings, been self-
consciously and self-critically aware of itself as a system which is supposed to make some kind 
of overall sense.  It has never been allowed to grow in the chaotic, disorganized, unplanned, 
eccentric confusion which . . . continued to mark the growth of English law.”); HORWITZ, 
supra note 94 (examining the battle between the Classic Legal Thought and Progressive Legal 
Thought); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES 
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895, at 3 (1960) (analyzing the “relationships among the 
doctrines and decisions of the courts, the social tensions of the time, and the changing 
attitudes of lawyers and judges”); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942).  For a more nuanced review, 
see David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of 
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93 (1990). 
130. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 58–59 (1991); see 
also id. at 261 (“The sharp recognition of change, the sense of inherited traditions no longer 
appropriate to a new reality, in turn gave new energy to the impulse toward realism.”). 
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tool for social progress rather than as a passive actor. 
Freed from custom and the despair occasioned by pre-determined 
inevitable or perhaps cyclical progress,131 law for many then became an 
instrument for change, affected by the subjective judgment of the 
actor—the judge—and guided, if at all, by reason and informal 
institutional constraints.  The anti-formalist jurists viewed the process of 
judging, and thus the common law, as much more subjective than a 
search for universal truths.  Throughout his writings, Justice Holmes 
underscored this point: Judges effectively make law, whether when 
interpreting the spoken or written word.  He strongly chastised the 
formalism and its accompanying acceptance of natural law: “The jurists 
who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind 
that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their 
neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”132  
Mirroring aspects of historical jurisprudence,133 Holmes emphasized that 
 
131. “If historicism meant that the past could no longer be linked unequivocally to the 
present and future, it could no longer serve as the basis for action.”  Id. at 286.  This altered 
the idea of progress, away from one tied inextricably to the inevitable cyclical rise and decline 
of civilizations.  Stephen Feldman explains that, following the Civil War,  
American legal thought entered its modernist period with the onset of positivism: 
for the most part, jurisprudents repudiated natural law.  Consequently, the idea of 
progress was unleashed from the natural law limits that inhered during the 
premodern era.  Progress came to be seen as potentially endless, dependent solely 
on human ingenuity.  
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 188 (2000).  But many scholars could not 
break cleanly from the past, and still viewed the past as capable of revealing universal truths, 
a view that waned more dramatically by the 1920s.  ROSS, supra note 130, at 286–87, 292–93, 
315–17.  Ross adds that, from 1912 to 1920, “[t]he combination of progressivism and war 
worked in a number of ways to distance Americans from their past and to strengthen the call 
for sciences of social control.” Id. at 319. 
132. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). 
133. The historical jurisprudence school emerged during the republic’s nascent years.  
Although Perry Miller suggests that few colonists were aware of this movement, see MILLER, 
LIFE MIND, supra note 71, at 259, this school of thought embraced the notion that law was not 
ahistorical; rather it reflected the experience of the people, at a particular time and place in 
history.  Baron de Montesquieu, for instance, although perhaps underemphasizing any 
temporal component, wrote that laws are peculiar to a society, affected by such variables as 
climate or geography.  1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 
316 (Thomas Nugent, trans., London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 1752) (1748).  Julius Stone 
explains that historical jurisprudence, led by Friedrich Karl von Savigny, “appeared on the 
Continent early in the nineteenth century as a part of the romanticist revival and in reaction 
from the universalist and creative juristic thought of the preceding natural law period.”  
JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND 
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law embraced experience over logic, social goals over adherence to 
tradition.134  Portraying the sociological aspect of law, Roscoe Pound 
added: 
[w]e do not base institutions upon deduction from assumed 
principles of human nature; we require them to exhibit practical 
utility, and we rest them upon a foundation of policy and 
established adaptation to human needs. . . .  We have to rid 
ourselves of this sort of legality and to attain a pragmatic, a 
sociological legal science.135 
And the legal realists, an eclectic amalgamation of disparate scholars 
but utterly enthralled with the possibilities of empirically based science 
and committed to reducing uncertainty,136 underscored law’s dynamic 
 
SOCIAL CONTROL 35 (1950).  It provided a temporal component to law, although tying it to 
the rise and ultimate decay of a nation’s life.  See PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE 
STORY OF AN IDEA 59 (1980).  Others such as Rudolph von Jhering added that legal 
development is a product of conscious choices by legal actors attempting to resolve “the 
problems of social life.”  Id. at 67.  Maine’s classic Ancient Law is a product of this 
appreciation, and so too is Holmes’s The Common Law.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW (Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 1881); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: 
ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN 
IDEAS (London, John Murray 1861).  And while the late nineteenth century society looked 
materially different than the antebellum period, the adherents to some or all aspects of 
historical jurisprudence championed the vitality of the common law, particularly over those 
who favored codification, as a system for allowing law to mirror changing human behavior.  A 
prominent opponent to the late nineteenth century codification movement explained: 
The system . . . rests upon an original, but ever growing, body of custom, and the 
rules thus established have been, through a long succession of centuries, expounded, 
applied, enlarged, modified and administered by a class of experts—lawyers and 
judges—who are supposed to devote their lives to the study of the system and to the 
work of adapting it to the ever shifting phases which human affairs assume. 
James C. Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law (1884), reprinted in 
SPENCER L. KIMBALL, THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 377, 377 
(1966).  Quite possibly one of the best syntheses of this era is David Rabban’s new book.  
DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013). 
134. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE 
INNER SELF 148–224 (1993) [hereinafter G. EDWARD WHITE, HOLMES]. 
135. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908). 
136. “Legal realism is a name for pragmatic and empirical thinking about the law; its 
confusions are due to an uncritical acceptance of the dogmas of raw empiricism and 
pragmatism without any consideration of the philosophical issues which these dogmas raise, 
but certainly do not resolve.”  K.N. Llewellyn et al., Law and the Modern Mind: A 
Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 91 (1931) (Adler comments on JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a 
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and malleable qualities.  
A particular emphasis of the legal realists, in a decade of rapid 
and dramatic technological change, was upon the need for a 
dynamic law.  They stressed the inability of old rules to provide 
clear guidance for the unprecedented situation characteristic of 
a world in flux and the need for judges to confront present 
reality.137   
Whether individually or collectively, the historical jurisprudents, the 
sociological jurisprudents, and the legal realists, laid barren the 
preexisting intellectual foundations for a federal common law—and 
quite possibly left the common law itself naked amidst claims of 
unbridled discretion.  If, after all, law is an instrument for social 
engineering by those with power,138 and the common law, in the words of 
Pound, is malleable to adapt according to a judge’s appreciation for 
“social progress,” how and on what basis could a federal court divine 
some nationally uniform customary rule to prescribe individual societal 
relations?  It is no wonder that President Theodore Roosevelt spoke so 
plainly about the power of judges in his 1908 State of the Union 
Address.139 
 
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 271–72 (1997).  See generally N.E.H. HULL, 
ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
(1997); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); WILLIAM TWINING, 
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS 
OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and 
Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979). 
137. PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918–1969, at 75 (1972). 
138. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FOUNDATION OF LAW 11 (1961); see also DAVID 
WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 118 (1974) (Pound emphasized “the need 
for men to use law as an instrument for securing changing social interests”). 
139. President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 8, 1903).  
Roosevelt remarked: 
The chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges, because they 
are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract, property, vested 
rights, due process of law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of 
social philosophy, and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to 
all law-making. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions 
depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of 
our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold 
to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown 
philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. 
Id. 
10 KALEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:23 PM 
550 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:517 
Against this background, that Swift v. Tyson lasted so long, or that 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was decided at the height of the evolving 
dialogue about the nature and function of the judicial process, is not 
surprising.140  One of the nation’s foremost legal historians of this period, 
Edward Purcell, aptly describes Swift as “one of the most famous cases 
in American law.”141  And he explains how legal positivism and Justice 
Holmes’ rejection of any transcendental higher, natural law made “Swift 
. . . an irresistible target.”142  Purcell observes that “[t]he idea that the 
federal courts could make an ‘independent judgment’ about abstract 
 
140. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1937).  Freyer chronicles the expansion of the Swift doctrine beyond its original application 
to general commercial law.  FREYER, supra note 111, at 45, 74.  The doctrine’s growth became 
entangled with federal and state relations, and “by the 1890s this notion was developed into 
an argument for the existence of a national common law—extending beyond general 
commercial jurisprudence—and including a whole corpus of federal judge-made decisions.” 
Id. at 72.  By the “late nineteenth century, searching criticism of [the] Swift doctrine and its 
application by federal judges emerged in legal periodicals and law school classrooms.”  Id. at 
84; see also id. at 92 (“By the 1890s the Swift doctrine had become a center of controversy.”).  
In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, for example, Justice Brewer wrote that in a 
fellow-servant rule case,  
[T]he question is essentially one of general law.  It does not depend upon any 
statute, it does not spring from any local usage or custom, there is in it no rule of 
property, but it rests upon those considerations of right and justice which have been 
gathered into the great body of the rules and principles known as the “common 
law.” 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893).  This provoked Justice Field 
to write,   
I cannot assent to the doctrine that there is an atmosphere of general law floating 
about all the States, not belonging to any of them, and of which the Federal judges 
are the especial possessors and guardians, to be applied by them to control judicial 
decisions of the state courts whenever they are in conflict with what those judges 
consider ought to be the law.  
Id. at 399 (Field, J., dissenting).  For a survey of the cases between Swift and Erie, as well as a 
few post Erie cases, see MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE COURTS 113–247 (1949). 
141. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, 
and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21 (2d ed. Kevin M. 
Clermont, ed. 2008) [hereinafter Purcell, Story of Erie]; see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE 
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 95–133 (2000) 
[hereinafter PURCELL, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION]. 
142. Purcell, Story of Erie, supra note 141, at 33.  But cf. Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, 
Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998) (suggesting that legal 
positivism does not necessarily undermine Swift). 
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legal principles and thereby identify a ‘true’ common-law rule struck 
[Holmes] as absurd.”143  Holmes wrote to Frederick Pollock that Swift 
was “indefensible but did not much harm when confined to what he was 
thinking of.”144 
Erie involved the accident to Harry Tompkins, whose left arm was 
severed by a passing train when a swinging door from the train knocked 
him to the ground alongside the railroad tracks.145  Because Harry had 
been walking beside the tracks, local law treated him as a trespasser and 
unable to recover for negligence.146  To avoid this problem, Tompkins 
filed suit in federal district under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, and 
also invoked Swift to justify applying a general law that would allow him 
to prevail.147  Tompkins won at both the district court and appellate 
level, with both courts applying general law.148  Erie’s lawyers argued to 
the Supreme Court that Swift only applied when the local law had not 
been settled.149  But the Court appeared intent on the larger question of 
Swift’s lingering vitality.150  And when the 6-2 majority of the Court 
decided to “bury” Swift, it needed to do so on constitutional grounds to 
avoid having it rise again.151  Justice Brandeis’ majority opinion is “spare 
and abstract,” and focused on the mischief the doctrine facilitated in 
diversity cases.152  He acknowledged the criticism both of the doctrine 
and Story’s interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789,153 and then held 
“[t]here is no federal general common law.”154  Brandeis endorsed 
 
143. Purcell, Story of Erie, supra note 141, at 33. 
144. 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE 
OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 219 (1941). 
145. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938); Purcell, Story of Erie, supra note 
141, at 38.  
146. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
147. Id.  
148. Id.  
149. Purcell, Story of Erie, supra note 141, at 45. 
150. Id. at 47. 
151. Id. at 51–53.  Purcell explains how the Justices debated whether to limit the decision 
to constitutional or statutory grounds, and that Justice Brandeis prevailed in his effort to 
secure a constitutional justification.  Id. 
152. Id. at 55–59. 
153. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–78.  Brandeis acknowledged supporters of the doctrine, as well.  
Id. at 77 n.22. 
154. Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.  And whether the law of 
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is 
not a matter of federal concern.  There is no federal general common law.”). 
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Holmes’ rejection of a body of law floating aimlessly in the sky 
untethered to “some definite authority behind it.”155  Although 
somewhat opaque, the opinion suggested that the Constitution 
demanded as much, because the Congress could not legislate the 
common law of the states and, derivatively, the federal courts could not 
perform a function that even Congress lacked.156 
But despite Erie, remnants of an ostensible federal common law 
remain.157  Indeed, on the same day that Justice Brandeis announced 
Erie, the Justice in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch 
Co., offered in dicta that a federal common law still existed in interstate 
disputes.158  Later, in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the Court 
applied federal law for a claim involving commercial paper issued by the 
United States.159  One prominent vestige is the Court’s post-Erie reliance 
on pre-Erie interstate litigation over boundaries, water, and then 
pollution.160  These cases are often mistakenly assumed as evidence of a 
persistence of some federal common law, even after jurists long 
discarded the idea of ex ante legal rules capable of being crystallized 
from uniform principles.  Yet, as explained in Part III, these cases are 
instead a product of the Court’s effort to explore the scope of its original 
 
155. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab  & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
156. Id. at 78; see also Purcell, Story of Erie, supra note 141, at 60–63.  Brandeis’ 
principal biographer refers to this opinion as “uncharacteristically obtuse.”  MELVIN I. 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 747 (2009). 
157. Erie arguably has been muted by having it primarily used against forum shopping in 
diversity cases.  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  But the debate surrounding Erie’s domain has 
far from subsided.  Abbe Gluck, for instance, suggests that Erie does not resolve whether 
state methodologies for statutory interpretation constitute law that federal courts ought to 
follow.  Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the 
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1901–05 (2011).  Michael Green posits that Erie ignores 
the possible scenario that state courts might prefer having federal courts craft independent 
rules of decision, although explaining how that result is problematic.  Michael Steven Green, 
Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1112–13 (2011). 
158. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); 
see infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
159. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Douglas not only suggested that federal law would apply because the case involved 
rights emanating from a federal source, he oddly observed that the general commercial law 
under Swift based on the law merchant “stands as a convenient source of reference for 
fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions.”  Id. at 367.  
160. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (water); Missouri I, 180 U.S. 208 
(1901) (pollution).  
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jurisdiction and less about federal common law. 
III. INTERSTATE DISPUTES: FEDERAL JURISDICTION OR FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW? 
This mosaic of issues shadowing the federal common law during our 
first century and a half signals that we should be cautious before simply 
accepting that aspects of a federal common law remain, particularly in 
interstate disputes.  While many of the Court’s pre-Erie decisions might 
appear to involve federal common law claims, they do not.161  The cases 
involving interstate disputes are no exception; these were not federal 
common law cases, but rather they collectively represent the Court’s 
exploration into the scope of its original jurisdiction, and the application 
of “equity” jurisprudence.  The early cases, in particular, illustrate the 
Court’s emphasis on the scope of its original jurisdiction,162 including the 
scope of a federal court’s equity jurisdiction, as well as the corollary 
incipient theory of parens patriae.163  Florida v. Anderson is illustrative.164  
 
161. A good example is Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 551 (1892), 
where the state initiated litigation in state court to restrain a company from mining in the 
Coosaw river, only to have the matter removed to federal court with an allegation that the 
state’s action violated the Constitution’s Contract Clause.  Id.  In New Hampshire v. 
Louisiana, New Hampshire and New York passed laws allowing private citizens to assign to 
the state their claims against another state for the express purpose of allowing New 
Hampshire or New York to sue the other state in the Supreme Court.  108 U.S. 76, 88–90 
(1883). After recounting the history surrounding Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793), and the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held that such manufactured 
suits, where the citizens were using the name of the state to secure jurisdiction, could not be 
allowed under either the letter or spirit of the Constitution.  New Hampshire, 108 U.S. at 86–
91.  The Court further indicated that nothing in the law of nations permitted a state to sue on 
behalf of its citizens (in effect, as parens patriae).  Id. at 91.  Later, in Hans v. Louisiana, the 
Court held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear cases between a state and one of its 
citizens.  134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890).  In so doing, the Court observed that “[s]ome things, 
undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were not known as such at the common law, such, 
for example, as controversies between states as to boundary lines, and other questions 
admitting of judicial solution.”  Id. at 15. 
162. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
163. In Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., for example, the Court applied 
common law public nuisance principles when exploring whether it could exercise equity 
jurisdiction to enjoin a bridge construction authorized by Congress.  37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 97 
(1838).  The Court held that the Town of Georgetown, as a corporation, could not sue on 
behalf of its residents for a public nuisance.  Id. at 99–100.  Other cases later in the century 
grappled with how to approach state-sanctioned obstructions to interstate commerce.  See 
generally Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First Century, 13 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 417, 424–50 (1988).  In Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, for instance, 
the Court expressly rejected a “common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions 
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The case involved a bill in equity filed by Florida on its own behalf and 
on behalf of the State’s internal improvement fund, against citizens of 
Georgia.165  Pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave the 
Court exclusive original jurisdiction in cases between two states, and 
concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving a state and citizens of another 
state.166  The Court initially inquired whether Florida was a proper party, 
whether its interests were sufficiently direct to invoke the Court’s 
original jurisdiction; once the Court decided affirmatively, it then 
addressed whether equity warranted an injunction—the part of its 
opinion lacking any discussion of “law.”167   
Similar issues surfaced in state boundary disputes.168  Early in his 
legal career, Alexander Hamilton represented states in boundary 
fights.169  He and others naturally anticipated the need for an impartial 
forum for resolving such disputes, one better suited than the process 
required by the Articles of Confederation.170  Initially the framers 
 
and nuisances in navigable rivers.”  125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888).  It distinguished Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling Bridge, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851), noting that in Wheeling Bridge the Court had 
held that the State of Pennsylvania was a proper party to invoke the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, and once invoked the Court “had power to apply, any law applicable to the case, 
whether state law, federal law, or international law.”  Willamette, 125 U.S. at 15.  In Wheeling 
Bridge, counsel for Pennsylvania argued that free flowing navigation along the Ohio River 
was protected by the Constitution and pre-existing state compacts.  See ELIZABETH BRAND 
MONROE, THE WHEELING BRIDGE CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY 106 (1992); Elizabeth B. Monroe, Spanning the Commerce Clause: The 
Wheeling Bridge Case, 1850–1856, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 280 (1988).  A similar 
economic fight occurred between Superior City, Wisconsin, and Duluth, Minnesota, with 
citizens of the former city concerned that their commerce would be adversely affected by 
Duluth’s canal construction and water diversion.  Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1877).  
The Court avoided any serious inquiry, by concluding that Congress authorized Duluth’s 
activities and the Court could not enjoin a legitimately authorized federal program.  Id. at 
387–88.  
164. Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S. 667 (1875). 
165. Id. at 669–70. 
166. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1251 
(2006)) (providing that the Court may exercise exclusive original jurisdiction only when both 
parties are states, otherwise concurrent jurisdiction obtains).  For a thorough summary of 
many original jurisdiction cases, see Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States 
Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665 (1959). 
167. Anderson, 91 U.S. at 675–81. 
168. E.g., Iowa v. Illinois, 151 U.S. 238 (1894). 
169. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: 
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 544–684 (1964). 
170. Julius Goebel explains that the boundary disputes were delayed during the 
revolution, but “[f]uture settlement of such interstate problems had been anticipated, 
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contemplated that the Constitution would mirror the old process for 
boundary disputes: The Articles provided for a specially developed 
forum under the direction of the Senate.171  The Committee of Detail 
recommended a similar process, with “[c]ontroversies between states 
respecting jurisdiction or territory, and controversies concerning lands 
claimed under grants of different states, . . . tried by the Senate.”172  And 
yet Hamilton, who would serve on the Committee of Style, had written 
in the Federalist Papers that a forum was essential for states to resolve 
their disputes, and that state dignity warranted other than an “inferior 
tribunal.”173  After the Committee on Detail submitted draft language to 
the convention on August 6, 1787, including language granting the 
Court original jurisdiction in any case involving a state,174 the convention 
debated how to address controversies between states and voted to have 
such matters decided by the Supreme Court.175 
One of the early boundary skirmishes occurred between Connecticut 
 
however, in the framing of the Articles of the Confederation, and the machinery had been 
devised for their solution.” Id. at 563; see also id. at 564 (explaining boundary dispute 
resolution process under the Articles of Confederation). 
171. Id. at 662–63.  See J. Franklin Jameson, The Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in 
ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE 
PERIOD 1775–1789, at 1–2 (Franklin Jameson ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1889) (on file with 
author) (noting that Article IX, paragraphs two and three of the Articles of Confederation 
“provided an especial process by which Congress was to determine . . . these disputes”).  For a 
discussion of state land disputes, see RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION 
1781–1789, at 220–25 (1987). 
172. 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR CIVIL 
WAR 586 (N.Y.C. & London, Harper & Brothers Publishers 1889). 
173. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton wrote “it would ill suit” a state’s dignity should a 
lawsuit to which it is a party “be turned over to an inferior tribunal.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 
81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  And in Federalist No. 80, 
Hamilton refers to territorial disputes and other “bickerings and animosities,” as well as the 
need for an impartial arbiter.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 477–78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
174. Randolph’s original draft would have left to the legislature the authority to decide 
when disputes between two states would be in the jurisdiction of the “Supreme Tribunal.”  
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 534 (1928).  The Committee of 
Detail proposed that the Court’s jurisdiction would extend to controversies between two 
states, and between state and citizens of another state, and the language produced little 
debate.  Id. at 535–36. 
175. Id. at 544.  On August 24, 1787, the Convention debated and, over the objection of 
North Carolina and Georgia, voted to have disputes between two states included in the 
Court’s original jurisdiction.  The draft language presented by the Committee on Style on 
September 12, 1787, included such language.  Id. 
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and New York, where each state purported to convey the same property 
to different grantees.176  The grantees from each state sought to have the 
dispute heard in their own state courts, or at the least before the federal 
courts in their states, and the question was whether the Supreme Court 
would intervene.177  Justice Patterson observed that the Court owed a 
“duty . . . to declare, and not to make, the law,” and because the case did 
not involve a controversy between two states, the Court lacked 
jurisdiction.178  Justice Cushing added that the issue had to be 
determined by the “constitution,” not one governed by any analogy 
from “English practice,” and that absent the states’ presence as parties 
and fighting over jurisdiction, no jurisdiction existed.179  The Court 
subsequently refused New York’s request for an injunction (a bill in 
equity) and, as such, allowed a lawsuit between the two state grantees to 
continue in circuit court.180  In New York v. Connecticut, Justice 
Patterson observed, “[i]t is difficult and painful to conjecture, unless this 
court can, under the constitution, lay hold of the case to decide the 
question of boundary, which will be a decision of all the appendages and 
consequences.”181  Justices Chase, Washington and Ellsworth rejected as 
sufficient the State’s asserted jurisdiction over—rather than any direct 
interest in—the property.182 
But Rhode Island v. Massachusetts183 became the seminal precedent 
 
176. Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 411 (1799). 
177. Id. at 412. 
178. Id. at 414. 
179. Id. 
180. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 3, 3 n.1 (1799). 
181. Id. at 4 & n.3. 
182. Id. at 3.  These early cases explored what procedure the court should follow.  In 
“Grayson v. Virginia . . . the court . . . adopted, as a general rule, the custom and usage of 
courts of admiralty and equity, with a discretionary authority, however, to deviate from that 
rule where its application would be injurious or impracticable.”  Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 
(17 How.) 478, 492 (1854) (discussing Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796)).  In 
Florida v. Georgia, Chief Justice Taney would later emphasize that chancery practice 
furnishes the most apt analogy, although the Court may deviate from that practice when 
justice so requires.  Id. at 492–93.  And there he rejected English chancery practice and 
allowed the United States attorney general to intervene in a state boundary dispute, as a 
matter of justice.  Id. at 496. 
183. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (Massachusetts V), 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 639–40 
(1846) (merits, with Chief Justice Taney again objecting to the Court’s assertion of 
jurisdiction); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (Massachusetts IV), 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233 (1841) 
(merits); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210 (1840); Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts (Massachusetts II), 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (initial decision on 
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for future interstate cases, with the Court confirming both its 
jurisdiction over “States” when sued by other “States,” and that the 
claims in these cases did not otherwise bar the Court from exercising 
jurisdiction.184  Rhode Island initiated the action under the Court’s 
equity jurisdiction, not under the common law, seeking to have the 
Court settle a boundary dispute between Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts.185  Rhode Island claimed a sovereign right to exercise 
jurisdiction over approximately 80 to 100 square miles, based upon pre-
Constitution arrangements.186  For Massachusetts, Daniel Webster and 
the State’s Attorney General argued that the pre-Constitution 
agreements afforded Massachusetts with title to the disputed land, and 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.187  The Constitution, 
they argued, only allowed the Court to hear controversies between 
states that arose out of their capacity as states following the 
Constitution, and that absent any positive law the Court would lack any 
law to apply.188  Rhode Island’s counsel countered that the Constitution’s 
terms afforded jurisdiction over inter-state disputes, and that nothing 
limited the clause to disputes over post-Constitution agreements.189  
Rhode Island further argued that the dispute was judicial, not political 
in character—as suggested by Massachusetts.190  And when responding 
to Massachusetts’ argument that no “law” existed that would admit 
judicial inquiry, Rhode Island replied that the Constitution conferred 
jurisdiction and what law applies once jurisdiction exists is dependent 
 
jurisdiction); Massachusetts v. Rhode Island, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 226, 226, 228 (1837) (case filed 
in 1832, and continued due to illness of senior counsel).  For a discussion of the case, see Carl 
B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836–64, in 5 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 514–16 (Paul A. Freund ed. 
1974). 
184. The case occurred shortly after Chief Justice Marshall had indicated, almost in 
passing, that the Constitution (and indirectly the Judiciary Act of 1789) provided exclusive 
jurisdiction in the Court for suits between two states.  New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 284, 290 (1831). 
185. Massachusetts II, 37 U.S. at 714–15. 
186. Id. at 714–17. 
187. Id. at 718. 
188. Massachusetts Attorney General Austin argued “[t]here are no principles of law, 
meaning the common law, or the statutes of the states, or of congress, that embrace a 
sovereign state.  There is no usage in such cases.”  Id. at 685. 
189. Id. at 688–90.  He added that the matter was addressed specifically during the 
constitutional convention and in the state conventions, permitting jurisdiction.  Id. at 690–91. 
190. Id. at 691–92. 
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upon “principles and rules of justice, equity and good conscience.”191 
Over the objection of Chief Justice Taney,192 Justice Baldwin’s 
majority opinion held that these boundary dispute cases were properly 
brought under the Court’s original jurisdiction.193  He noted that the 
framers were well aware of the many existing boundary disputes.194  No 
other apparent route existed to settle these disputes, neither war nor 
treaty, and the Constitution further provided that the states could only 
settle disputes through compact, if approved by Congress.195  “There can 
be but two tribunals under the constitution who can act on the 
boundaries of states,”196 he observed, 
the legislative or the judicial power; the former is limited in 
express terms to assent or dissent, where a compact or 
agreement is referred to them by the states; and as the latter 
can be exercised only by this Court, when a state is a party, the 
power is here, or it cannot exist.197 
He next determined that the case did not necessarily involve a political 
question, but rather one capable of being decided by a court of law or 
equity.198  “If we cannot ‘establish justice’ between these litigant states, 
as the tribunal to which they have both submitted the adjudication of 
their respective controversies,”199 Baldwin reasoned, 
it will be a source of deep regret to all who are desirous that each 
department of the government of the Union should have the 
 
191. Id. at 697.  Rhode Island emphasized that the matter involved equity, and that 
many cases involved disputes unrelated to state common law.  Id. 
192. Carl Swisher explains that Massachusetts’ Attorney General Austin argued that the 
relief requested was neither legal nor equitable, but rather political and not capable of being 
resolved by the judiciary.  Swisher, supra note 183, at 513.  Taney agreed, noting that the state 
sought a declaration of sovereignty.  Massachusetts II, 37 U.S. at 752–53.  Oddly, Taney 
decided the next phase in the litigation, emphasizing the role of a chancery court to consider 
equitable principles and, as such, ordered that Massachusetts respond to Rhode Island’s bill 
of complaint.  Massachusetts IV, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233, 269–74 (1841).  Rhode Island 
ultimately lost, at which point Taney again reaffirmed his belief that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction.  Massachusetts V, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 639 (1846). 
193. Massachusetts II, 37 U.S. at 720. 
194. Id. at 723–24. 
195. Id. at 724–25. 
196. Id. at 726. 
197. Id. at 726–27. 
198. Id. at 737. 
199. Id. at 731. 
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capacity of acting within its appropriate orbit, as the instrument 
appointed by the constitution, so to execute its agency as to 
make this bond of union between the states more perfect, and 
thereby enforce the domestic tranquility of each and all.200 
With that, Justice Baldwin then proceeded to examine the merits as one 
for a bill in equity according to the usages of equity.201 
Not until late nineteenth century did the boundary cases emerge as 
precedent for other interstate disputes.202  The principal case was 
Missouri v. Illinois.203  There, Missouri filed a bill in the Supreme Court 
to “enjoin” Illinois and the City of Chicago Sanitary District “from 
discharging the undefecated sewage and noxious filth of the city of 
Chicago into the Mississippi river by artificial methods.”204  Chicago at 
the turn of the century had approximately 1.5 million residents, and 
little doubt existed that many downstream cities and towns along the 
Mississippi river relied upon the river water for drinking as well as 
domestic, manufacturing, agricultural, and stock watering uses; and the 
Sanitary District of Chicago, created in 1889,205 did not dispute the 
importance of the water, but instead denied “that the carrying out its 
plans will destroy the flow and adaptability of the waters of the 
Mississippi River, along the territory of [Missouri], for domestic or other 
 
200. Id.  Justice Baldwin referenced a long history of deciding such disputes, reaffirming 
that the issues were judicial not political.  Id. at 742–48. 
201. Id. at 744; see also id. at 742 (“From this view of the law in England, the results are 
clear, that the settlement of boundaries by the king in council, is by his prerogative; which is 
political power acting on a political question between dependent corporations or 
proprietaries, in his dominions without the realm.  When it is done in chancery, it is by its 
judicial power . . . and necessarily a judicial question . . . .”). 
202. The Court continued to decide boundary disputes.  E.g., Iowa v. Illinois, 151 U.S. 
238 (1894). 
203. Missouri I, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).  For a thoughtful treatment of the dispute, see 
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 76–82. 
204. Suggestions in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill at 1, Missouri I, 180 U.S. 
208 (1901) (No. 5). 
205. In 1822, Congress granted Illinois the authority to build a canal connecting Lake 
Michigan and the Illinois River, Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 659, further aided by an 
1827 Act that transferred land to the State for purposes of the canal, Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 
51, 4 Stat. 234.  In 1865, Illinois authorized Chicago to deepen the canal for the express 
purpose of disposing of sewage.  See An Act to Create Sanitary Districts, and to Remove 
Obstructions in the Des Plaines and Rivers, May 29, 1889; Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 210, 241–42.  
In City of St. Louis v. Rutz, the Court held that the two states exercised concurrent 
jurisdiction over the river, with each state exercising exclusive jurisdiction over the lands 
adjacent to their own shores.  138 U.S. 226 (1891). 
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uses.”206 
Justice Shiras’ Missouri opinion tracks the parties’ arguments.  
Neither state argued that public nuisance was a federal common law, 
and therefore “laws” of the United States for purposes of jurisdiction; 
instead, they both focused first on the “nature of the parties” and 
whether that gave the Court original jurisdiction, and second on the 
nature of equity jurisprudence and ability of courts to issue injunctive 
relief.207  Missouri referenced several lead cases that “sufficiently 
establish the right of the State, in its character as such, to present to a 
court of equity a bill for the abatement of a public nuisance.  The matter 
is one which concerns the State itself.”208  Missouri also invoked the 
Federalist Papers and argued that the Court had jurisdiction to settle 
disputes between two states, noting that it lacked any other means of 
protecting its citizens, such as waging war or invading Illinois.209  
Missouri, therefore, asked the Court to decide whether it had 
“surrendered or given up so completely her sovereignty as will prevent 
her, at least in a court of the United States, from suing to protect the 
waters and streams over which she has jurisdiction, in order to protect 
the lives and health of her citizens against the unlawful acts of another 
State or the citizens of another State?”210  Illinois’ principal retort was to 
 
206.  Separate Answer of The State of Illinois to the Bill of Complaint of the Said State 
of Missouri at 18, Missouri I, 180 U.S. 208 (No. 5). 
207. Brief and Argument in Support of the Demurrer to the Bill of Complaint at 3, 
Missouri I, 180 U.S. 208 (No. 5).  The Constitution extends the federal judiciary’s authority to 
hear cases in both law and equity.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see STORY, supra note 77, at 
608 (“Courts of Equity however maintain a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases . . . where the 
remedy at law is not adequate or complete.”). 
208. Brief and Argument of Complainant In Opposition to Joint Demurrer of 
Defendants to Bill of Complaint at 35, Missouri I, 180 U.S. 208 (No. 5).  Missouri argued that 
Illinois’ reliance on Louisiana v. Texas ignored that, there, the State of Louisiana was not 
itself engaged in interstate commerce, but instead was lending its name to Louisiana citizens 
engaged in interstate commerce who allegedly were being harmed by Texas.  Id. at 34–38 
(discussing Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900)).  Missouri instead relied on Florida v. 
Anderson, where Justice Bradley held that Florida had a sufficient interest in the subject 
matter of the suit to afford it “standing” to sue in equity.  Id. at 38–39 (relying on Florida v. 
Anderson, 91 U.S. 667, 675–76 (1875). 
209. Suggestions in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill, supra note 204, at 3–5.  
Missouri initially referenced Georgia v. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792), then Oswald v. 
Georgia; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge 
Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851); Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1877), and Massachusetts 
II, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).  Suggestions in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill, supra 
note 204, at 5–7. 
210. Suggestions in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill at 7, Missouri I, 180 U.S. 
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ask the Court to focus less on the character of the case and more on the 
parties.211  And here Illinois attempted to persuade the Court that 
Missouri was not a legitimate party, that the dispute really was between 
the Sanitation District and certain cities and towns, as well as persons in 
Missouri, and that Missouri was not alleging any harm to its own 
property.212 
In rejecting Illinois’ argument, the Court examined the framers’ 
understanding of the original jurisdiction clause.213  Both this history as 
well as earlier cases confirmed that Missouri’s complaint fell within the 
ambit of the Court’s original jurisdiction.  Justice Shiras observed, 
The cases cited show that such jurisdiction has been exercised in 
cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their 
inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and 
interests of a State.  But such cases manifestly do not cover the 
entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which 
the Constitution has provided a remedy; and it would be 
objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the court to anticipate 
by definition what controversies can and what cannot be brought 
within the original jurisdiction of this court.214 
And the Court concluded that Missouri could seek to protect the 
health and comfort of its residents, particularly when the issues could 
affect the entire State.215  When the case subsequently proceeded on the 
merits, Justice Holmes expressed caution before the Court would 
intervene and award equitable relief, and concluded the facts before the 
Court did not warrant relief.216  It would be a mistake, therefore, to 
suggest that the Court in Missouri v. Illinois consciously recognized the 
 
208. 
211. Brief and Argument in Support of the Demurrer to the Bill of Complaint, supra 
note 207, at 3. 
212. Id. at 3–7. 
213. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 220–24, 239, 249. 
214. Id. at 240–41 (emphasis added). 
215. Id. at 241.  The Court further determined that the Sanitation District effectively 
operated under the auspices of the State and that Illinois, therefore, was a proper state 
defendant.  Id. at 242.  The final part of the Court’s opinion addressed Missouri’s requested 
equitable remedy, with the Court supporting the use of public nuisance as a valid equitable 
remedy.  Id. at 248.  Justices Fuller, Harlan and White dissented, concluding that no “direct 
antagonism” existed between the two states and further that the Bill failed to establish 
sufficient elements to warrant proceeding under a nuisance theory.  Id. at 249.  
216. Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
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availability of any federal common law cause of action for interstate 
pollution.217 
And when the Court shortly thereafter confirmed its jurisdiction to 
resolve interstate water disputes and, again, interstate pollution, it had 
ample precedent, particularly with Missouri v. Illinois and Rhode Island 
v. Massachusetts.  When Kansas sued Colorado for Colorado’s diversion 
of water from the Arkansas River, depriving Kansas’s farmers of 
irrigation water, Colorado argued that the Court lacked original 
jurisdiction because Kansas was suing to protect its residents, not its 
own property.218  Chief Justice Fuller, although having dissented in 
Missouri v. Illinois, wrote that states could maintain suits on behalf of its 
citizens as “parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or representative of all or a 
considerable portion of its citizens.”219  And responding to Kansas’ 
merits argument that Colorado was depriving the residents of Kansas of 
 
217. Missouri II, moreover, cannot be understood from a modern lawyer’s perspective.  
Along with the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction, two other doctrines emerged during 
this period, infecting both the tenor of the arguments and the Court’s decision: the scope of 
federal equity jurisprudence and a tort-based concept of public nuisance.  To begin with, 
modern tort law only began to emerge during this era.  See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW 
IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20–62 (1980).  Contemporary treatises on torts 
focused primarily on the law of negligence.   See GEORGE CHASE, LEADING CASES UPON 
THE LAW OF TORTS (St. Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1892); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1878); THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. 
REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (N.Y.C., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 4th 
ed. 1888); SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1901); 
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (Phila., Law Booksellers, 
2d ed. 1878).  And lawyers often compartmentalized public nuisance as part of criminal law or 
equity jurisprudence.  Indeed, Illinois’s argument emphasized that a public nuisance was 
enforced through indictments, not through equitable injunctions.  And much of the Missouri’s 
brief relies heavily on then prevailing principles of equity jurisprudence, as well as Wood On 
Nuisances.  Cf. Austin Abbott, The Co-Operation of “Law” and “Equity;” and the Engrafting 
of Equitable Remedies upon Common-Law Proceedings, 7 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1893–1894).  
Second, the expansion of federal courts’ injunctive power became one of the more important 
late nineteenth century developments.  MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE 
IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 361 (1977).  The railroad strikes in the 1880s 
prompted the federal courts to issue injunctions against the boycotts on several different 
theories.  Id. at 405–06.  The most infamous case is In re Debbs.  158 U.S. 564 (1895).  And 
“courts at midcentury remained quite willing to issue injunctions, grant damages, and throw 
people in prison for fouling community health and environment.”  WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 221 
(1996). 
218. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142–43 (1902). 
219. Id. at 142.  The Chief Justice invoked the phrase from Missouri II that states could 
seek to protect the “health” and “comfort” of their citizens.  Id.  Indeed, Fuller added that the 
case presented little difficulty.  Id. at 144. 
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riparian flows, Fuller avoided the issue by observing that when the 
Court sits “as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal,” it applies 
“Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the 
particular case may demand,” but such matters were premature.220 
Such was the precedent when Holmes wrote his succinct opinion in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.221  The case involved Georgia’s original 
jurisdiction suit against the Tennessee Copper Company, seeking to 
restrain the facility from continuing to emit pollutants and injuring state 
forests and citizens.222  The reported Tennessee Copper case is the 
second case filed by Georgia against the neighboring copper plants.  
Georgia noted in its brief that, because the Court had allowed 
jurisdiction in the first case, it did not believe that the jurisdictional issue 
needed to be argued again.223  Holmes’ opinion focuses on the unique 
role of a state in a suit in equity, to protect its earth and air within its 
borders, and the need to approach the Court’s equitable role differently 
than if the case involved private parties.224  On the evidence, he then 
concludes that an injunction would be warranted if the defendant failed 
to restrain the fumes.225  The case reflects what G. Edward White 
 
220. Id. at 146–47.  The parties debated the applicable law, whether Colorado law or 
some ex ante law that would have applied prior to statehood, or riparian common law, as had 
been recently expressed in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 
702 (1899).  See generally Carman F. Randolph, Notes on Suits Between States: Kansas v. 
Colorado, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 364 (1902).  Kansas agued that the common law would apply, 
discussing the march of the common law in the region, as if to evidence a uniform common 
law (not a separate federal common law).  Brief of Complainant for Hearing on the 
Demurrer of Defendant at 9–10, Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (No. 10).  The state 
nevertheless acknowledged uncertainty surrounding what law applies.  Id. at 72 (“Are the 
states of the American union, in their conduct towards each other, to be governed by theories 
of international law, which each nation, itself indifferent, wishes every other nation to fully 
observe . . . .”).  But it then suggested that “[i]t seems to us that there exists an American jus 
gentium as between states, based upon the common law, as just and as fair as the common 
law, and as rigid in its requirements.”  Id.  The Court subsequently parroted the Kansas v. 
Colorado language, referring to it collectively as an “interstate common law.”  Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 671 (1931). 
221. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236–39 (1907).  See generally 
DUNCAN MAYSILLES, DUCKTOWN SMOKE: THE FIGHT OVER ONE OF THE SOUTH’S 
GREATEST ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS (2011). 
222. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236. 
223. Replication of the Complainant, The State of Georgia, to the Answer of the 
Defendant, The Ducktown Sulphur, Corporation and Iron Company at 15, Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230. 
224. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236–39. 
225. Id. at 239. 
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explains is Holmes’ style of “letting his language” announce the 
applicable rule, rather than any extended use of logic, and often leaving 
“out many of the steps in his reasoning.”226 
The Court continued to hear interstate disputes, generally focusing 
on the merits of any injunctive relief rather than the role of the Court or 
the scope of its jurisdiction.227  The Court seemingly struggled with when 
it would exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction involving only one 
state as a party.228  In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., for example, 
 
226. G. EDWARD WHITE, HOLMES, supra note 134, at 480 (biography). 
227. See New Jersey v. New York, 289 U.S. 712 (1933); New Jersey v. New York, 284 
U.S. 585 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 280 
U.S. 514 (1929); New Jersey v. New York, 279 U.S. 823 (1929); see also Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (Platte river); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 
(1931) (concluding that federal, state, and international law govern disputes over diversions 
of the Ware and Swift rivers); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) (Lake Michigan 
diversions); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversions of the Laramie river); 
Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273 (1920) (boundary dispute).  In North Dakota v. 
Minnesota, for instance, when North Dakota sued for flooding of farm lands by activities in 
Minnesota, the Court noted that the “comfort, health, and prosperity of its farm owners that 
resort may be had to this court for relief. It is the creation of a public nuisance of simple type 
for which a state may properly ask an injunction.”  263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923). 
228. The Court, in Massachusetts v. Missouri, for instance, noted that it would, in 
appropriate cases, apply “accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of 
jurisprudence,” but in that case it already signaled that the Court would not exercise its 
original jurisdiction, and the attendant burden on the Court, when other avenues of relief 
might be available.  308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939).  Only a few years earlier, the Court had been 
willing to decide a dispute involving one state’s effort to collect a judgment against an out-of-
state entity.  Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933). Yet, in another 
instance involving two states, Justice Frankfurter expressed difficulty with the Court’s original 
jurisdiction: 
[T]here are practical limits to the efficacy of the adjudicatory process in the 
adjustment of interstate controversies. The limitations of litigation—its episodic 
character, its necessarily restricted scope of inquiry, its confined regard for 
considerations of policy, its dependence on the contingencies of a particular record, 
and other circumscribing factors—often denature and even mutilate the actualities 
of a problem and thereby render the litigious process unsuited for its solution. 
Considerations such as these have from time to time led this Court or some of its 
most distinguished members either to deprecate resort to this Court by states for 
settlement of their controversies, or to oppose assumption of jurisdiction. 
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 (1939) (citation omitted); see also Louisiana v. Cummins, 
314 U.S. 580 (1941) (contract action); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 20 (1939) 
(another forum better suited multi-state taxation claim).  These decisions arguably reflect the 
Court’s nascent efforts to restrict discretionary acceptance of original jurisdiction when 
concurrent jurisdiction exists.  E.g., Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) 
(declining jurisdiction in lieu of another forum); cf. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 587–88 (1985) (suggesting an appropriate exercise of the 
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Justice Douglas’ majority opinion allowed Georgia, acting in a parens 
patriae capacity, to sue railroad companies for federal antitrust 
violations.229  Douglas’s opinion suggests that the Court accepted 
original jurisdiction due to the gravity of the issues.230 
But when the interstate pollution cases emerged in the post-New 
Deal, modernist legal environment, the Court subtly began to lay the 
foundations for a broader environmentally based federal common law.  
It did so, however, ironically in a series of cases that effectively 
constricted the use of the Court’s original jurisdiction.  In Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,231 the Court rebuffed Ohio’s concern that 
mercury from plants in Michigan was killing fish in Lake Erie.232  
Wyandotte is a slightly different case from many of the earlier ones 
because it involved a suit between a state and citizens of an adjoining 
state, not between two states.233  Justice Harlan, writing for his 
colleagues other than Justice Douglas, expressed reservations about the 
practically of the Court hearing such cases involving “no serious issue of 
federal law,” and further indicating that little suggested the need for the 
Supreme Court to hear these cases under its original jurisdiction.234  
 
Court’s discretion).  See generally Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The 
Supreme Court’s Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 
185 (1993).  The Court already had limited its role in hearing cases involving consuls, by 
permitting concurrent lower federal court jurisdiction. Börs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 256–57 
(1884).  Although suggesting that Congress can restrict the Court’s original jurisdiction in 
cases involving state parties, Professor Amar observes “virtually no modern scholars or 
judges have argued that Congress can tamper with the Court’s irreducible core of original 
jurisdiction over ambassador cases.”  Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1523 (1990).  
229. Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945). 
230. Id. at 450–51.  The Court distinguished a prior case where it had rejected a state 
claim against railroad rates.  Id. at 452; Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
220 U.S. 277, 289 (1911).   
231. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).  See generally Bruce W. 
Ficken, Wyandotte and its Progeny: The Quest for Environmental Protection Through the 
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 78 DICK. L. REV. 429, 432–37 (1973–1974). 
232. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 494, 499. 
233. Id. at 494–96. 
234. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 747–52.  Percival suggests that Wyandotte marks 
a “fundamental shift” in the Court’s jurisprudence.  Id. at 751.  The issue, however, is more 
complicated.  The case ought to be viewed as part of the Court’s evolving approach toward its 
jurisdiction, starting first with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and then 
with Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).  Marbury concludes that Congress 
may not enlarge the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction, reasoning that the affirmative 
grant implies a negative prohibition against enlargement.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175.  But in 
Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall opined that “[i]f a state be a party, the jurisdiction of this 
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Although unnecessary to its decision, the Court added that the case 
presented no federal question—implicitly rejecting any suggestion of a 
federal common law.235  One contemporary commentary on the case 
suggested that the “opinion is laden with dicta and gratuitous 
observation that it will be the source of great jurisdictional controversy 
in the future.”236  A comparable fate befell the plaintiffs in Washington v. 
General Motors Corp.:237 although factually similar to Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the Court in General Motors Corp. rejected 
hearing a case involving an alleged conspiracy by automobile 
manufacturers to “impede the research and development of automotive 
air pollution control devices.”238  And then in Vermont v. New York,239 
 
court is original” rather than appellate.  Cohens, 19 U.S. 264 at 393.  But, Marshall later added 
that cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States fall within the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.  Id.  The former jurisdiction focuses on the character of the parties and 
the nature of the case is irrelevant, while the latter focuses on the nature of the case and 
renders the character of the parties irrelevant.  Id.  When both grounds are satisfied, Marshall 
explained, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is not obviated merely because a State is party in 
the lower courts.  The Court’s original jurisdiction, therefore, is not exclusive merely because 
a state is a party.  Id. at 395–98.  The affirmative grant of original jurisdiction does not, 
Marshall reasons, carry a corollary negative operation.  Id. at 398.  However, in the later case, 
Texas v. White, the Court announced “[i]t is not to be questioned that this court has original 
jurisdiction of suits by States against citizens of other States . . . .”  74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 719 
(1868); cf. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866) (holding that the Court does 
not have original jurisdiction over litigation in which a state sues a sitting President).  
235. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 498 n.3.  Of course, the Tenth Circuit held on February 8, 
1971, that a federal common law would apply in interstate pollution cases.  Texas v. Pankey, 
441 F.2d 236, 242 (10th Cir. 1971) (involving the spraying of pesticides to combat New Mexico 
range caterpillar, and adverse effects in Texas).  Justice Douglas would later rely heavily upon 
the Pankey case.  See infra note 250.  And Justice Douglas later prevailed by overruling this 
statement in Wyandotte in Milwaukee I.  See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972); 327 n.19 
(1981) (noting that the Wyandotte statement had been overruled). 
236. Winton D. Woods, Jr. & Kenneth R. Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate 
Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 691 
(1970).  The authors favored, in the then emerging “environmental decade,” a federal forum 
for interstate and international environmental disputes, and worried that Wyandotte 
inappropriately removed the possibility for federal district court jurisdiction.  Id. at 701–02.  
Dissenting in Wyandotte, Justice Douglas wrote that the issues warranted the Court’s 
attention and that a special master could handle the factual complexity.  Wyandotte, 401 U.S. 
at 506, 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas addressed this concern in Milwaukee I, 
406 U.S. at 102.  See infra note 250–53 and accompanying text. 
237. Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).  See generally Ficken, 
supra note 228, at 438. 
238. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. at 112. 
239. Vermont v. New York, 419 U.S. 961 (1974); Vermont v. New York, 409 U.S. 1103 
(1973); Vermont v. New York (Vermont II), 408 U.S. 917 (1972); Vermont v. New York 
(Vermont I), 406 U.S. 186 (1972).  See generally Ficken, supra note 231, at 447. 
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the Court, in a case somewhat similar to Wyandotte, accepted 
jurisdiction but decided that the Special Master’s approach for resolving 
an alleged public nuisance from the discharge of sludge into certain 
waters did not present enough of a judicial question.240  In doing so, 
however, the Court observed “[o]ur original jurisdiction heretofore has 
been deemed to extend to adjudications of controversies between States 
according to principles of law, some drawn from the international field, 
some expressing a ‘common law’ formulated over the decades by this 
Court.”241 
When, therefore, Illinois filed at the Court a bill to restrain 
Wisconsin cities and sewerage commissions from polluting Lake 
Michigan,242 the case appeared quite ordinary.  The Court until then had 
not held that a general federal common law of public nuisance existed.243  
It had established, instead, that the Court would exercise its exclusive 
original jurisdiction when two states were legitimate parties, and in 
doing so it would apply whatever law it deemed appropriate.244  And the 
Court triggered a discussion about what law would apply, when it asked 
the parties to brief specifically the question of whether state or federal 
law would apply.245  Illinois responded that federal common law 
operated in disputes between two states.246  The State relied principally 
upon the boundary dispute and interstate water allocation cases to 
assert that the Court “has repeatedly recognized the existence of a body 
of ‘interstate common law,’ made up of a number of components.”247  
Only in passing did the State inadvertently capture the Court’s past 
jurisprudence when it added that the Court could fashion its own 
authority in instances where the Court was exercising its constitutionally 
 
240. Vermont II, 408 U.S. at 917; Vermont I, 406 U.S. at 186.  
241. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974).  That cavalier language about the 
common law lacked precision, because the Court applied whatever ex ante “law” it deemed 
appropriate if it concluded that it had original jurisdiction.  Id. at 278.  
242. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
243. Id. at 102.  
244. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 258–59, 265 (1922), for instance, where two 
states applied the same common law doctrine, the Court indicated it would apply that 
doctrine. 
245. Plaintiff’s Brief Regarding the Applicable Law at 2, Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (No. 
49). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 5–10.  Illinois also referenced a 1921 one-page Harvard Law Review note 
suggesting that it would appear as if the Supreme Court was establishing a particular type of 
common law tailored to the unique status of quasi-sovereign states suing each other.  Id. at 5. 
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granted jurisdiction.248  The defendants too informed the Court that 
“‘Interstate Common Law’ as expressed in Connecticut vs. 
Massachusetts” would apply, absent the Court concluding that the newly 
passed Federal Water Pollution Control Act and a 1968 agreement 
between the states governed the dispute.249 
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas initially reviewed the scope of 
the Court’s original jurisdiction and then concluded that the case fell 
within the Court’s concurrent jurisdiction with the lower federal district 
courts.250  His analysis generally follows the contours of the cases 
discussed in this article, reasoning that the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction 
only covers suits between two or more states, not their political 
subdivisions.251  But from there, his opinion arguably takes a herculean 
leap generated by his apparent desire to ensure that lower courts can 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 (federal 
question jurisdiction).  He did this first by conflating the Constitution’s 
grant of jurisdiction over maritime and other constitutionally assigned 
matters with a federal common law, reasoning that, in maritime cases 
and therefore federal common law cases, federal courts can exercise 
federal question jurisdiction.252 
 
248. Id. at 11.  Illinois distinguished Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., noting that 
Illinois’ case involved a direct clash of competing sovereign interests, unlike in Wyandotte.  Id. 
at 12. 
249. Supplemental Brief of Racine and Kenosha at 12, Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (No. 
49); see also Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File the Bill of Compliant 
at 2–4, Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (No. 49) (arguing that the States had entered into an 
agreement, obviating need for the original jurisdiction action). 
250. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 98. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 99–101.  Justice Douglas relied, inter alia, on Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).  There, the Court 
engaged in an exhaustive review of federal maritime law to illustrate that maritime claims are 
cognizable in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Id.  This issue surfaced because 
the Constitution separately assigns jurisdiction over suits at law and equity arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime 
cases.  Id. at 373–80.  Could the latter, therefore, be folded into the former and warrant 
invoking federal question jurisdiction, and removal from state to federal court?  Justice 
Frankfurter’s detailed opinion explores how states and federal courts historically exerted 
concurrent jurisdiction over maritime matters.  And he explains why maritime law, as a 
general law assigned by the Constitution to the federal courts, is separate from today’s federal 
question jurisdiction.  Id.  Justice Brennan dissented from this aspect of Frankfurter’s 
opinion, which would have allowed the claims to be heard by federal juries in lieu of judges.  
Moreover, in Milwaukee I, Justice Douglas, who had joined in this aspect of Justice Brennan’s 
dissent, id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting), lifted one of Justice Brennan’s paragraphs slightly 
out of context.  Douglas also quotes two lower court cases suggesting that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
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Next, Justice Douglas—through brilliant sleight-of-hand—created 
the general federal public nuisance common law.  With little actual 
precedent for the broad statement, Douglas proclaimed “When we deal 
with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a 
federal common law.”253  And then in a footnote, after quoting from 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper and opining that boundary disputes and 
interstate water allocations present federal questions, Justice Douglas 
recasts the Court’s history by suggesting that even in the interstate 
pollution cases “it is not only the character of the parties that requires us 
to apply federal law.”254  He then proceeds to equate the Court’s prior 
interstate water cases and boundary disputes with claims by parties over 
interstate pollution.255  While observing that federal laws might soon 
preempt “the field of federal common law of nuisance,” he wrote for the 
Court that until then “federal courts will be empowered to appraise the 
equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water 
pollution.”256  Although the Court concluded the case must proceed in 
district court,257 Justice Douglas, a New Deal realist and environmental 
champion, provided the actual opening salvo for a federal common law 
public nuisance for interstate pollution divorced from the character of 
the parties. 
 
includes federal common law claims, and from there erroneously concludes that parties can 
rely on federal question jurisdiction for alleged federal common law claims.  See infra notes 
251–52 and accompanying text.  Prior to this case, the Court “had not previously indicated 
that the federal common law of nuisance provided a basis for federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”  Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 337 n.4 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
253. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103.  Douglas supported his statement with a reference to 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), and Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).  For a discussion of Lincoln Mills and why 
Douglas may have misused the case, see infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
254. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. 
255. Id. at 105–07. 
256. Id. at 108.  In Milwaukee II, the Court subsequently held that the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, displaced the alleged federal 
common law claim.  451 U.S. 304, 323 (1981).  Dissenting, Justice Blackmun, joined by 
Justices Marshall and Stevens, opined that the Court’s earlier cases established a federally 
created substantive right in instances where there are overriding federal interests warranting 
a uniform rule, such as in cases involving states and interstate pollution.  Id. at 332–39 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  These justices further argued that the Congress had not intended 
to displace the federal common of public nuisance recognized in these earlier cases.  Id. at 
339. 
257. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 108. 
10 KALEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:23 PM 
570 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:517 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING AN EXPANDED FEDERAL COMMON 
LAW 
Undoubtedly “the prevailing conception of the common law has 
changed since 1789.”258  And with it the notion of a uniform general 
common law has dwindled.  What seems relatively certain, however, is 
that the interstate pollution cases are less about any remnant of a 
federal common law and more about the Court’s struggle with the scope 
of its constitutionally-assigned jurisdiction.  Justice Hughes, for instance, 
discussed these cases not as common law cases but as cases involving the 
Court’s original jurisdiction.259  Bradford Clark similarly observed,  
Because neither states nor Congress generally possesses 
unilateral legislative competence to resolve interstate disputes, 
the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the Supreme 
Court will resolve such disputes.  The rules adopted and applied 
by the Court in these cases are best understood, not as federal 
common law, but as rules designed to implement the 
constitutional structure—specifically, the constitutional equality 
of the states.260   
Unfortunately, today’s Supreme Court ignores this history.  But before 
merely relegating this history to dusty old books, we should explore 
whether a federal common law of public nuisance is on a sufficiently 
related continuum with this past. 
Throughout our history, we have witnessed the tension between the 
past and the present, and between the need for continuity and 
predictability and the appreciation that law must evolve as part of the 
fabric of a changing society.  This occurred during the antebellum period 
and the years following the civil war;261 when the progressive movement 
 
258. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
259. See CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ITS FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 118–56 (1928). 
260.  Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (1996). 
261.  Compare William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles 
of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) 
(suggesting that judges purposefully decided cases to promote certain economic interests), 
and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977) 
(similar), with Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of 
American “Styles of Judicial Reasoning” in the 19th Century, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 1 (arguing 
that Nelson has “overstated and oversimplified the pre-Civil War role of instrumentalism 
through a selective examination of the evidence, and . . . that in the second half of the 
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navigated between formalism and realism;262 and it was prominently 
displayed during the New Deal period.263  At times, an unwritten 
customary law merged with higher law principles to support necessary 
change, as with the fight against slavery.264  At other times, it retarded 
social change, as during the formalist era.265  History, therefore, 
illustrates that balancing the need for continuity and predictability with 
an appreciation that a legal system ought to reflect its society, and 
evolve as society changes, requires more than a normative judgment 
about the importance of the end being sought.  It first requires an acute 
appreciation for precedent, understanding for instance that previous 
cases reflected the Court’s struggle with its original jurisdiction rather 
than any inquiry into the legitimacy of a federal common law for public 
nuisance.  And next it suggests the need for a searching analysis into 
whether that precedent ought to be extended, whether for instance it is 
appropriate to divorce the character of the parties from the nature of 
the claims. 
When, therefore, we explore the modern concept of a federal 
common law, we ought to consider carefully the underlying legal, 
political, social, and practical issues and assumptions animating our 
 
nineteenth century, long after what Nelson has represented as the mid-century discrediting of 
instrumentalism, judges continued to adhere to the instrumental style of reasoning in 
adjudicating major issues of public policy”).  Karl Llewellyn referred to the grand style of the 
common law, as a way of thought during this period that allowed judges to test whether or 
how to apply precedent.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 36 (1960). 
262. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
263. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); JEFF SHESOL, 
SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
264. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 6 (1975) (discussing the role of judges as “the pillars of legal 
respectability and of their collaboration in a system of oppression—Negro slavery”); 
PALUDAN, supra note 93 (maintaining that formative era legal thinkers “demonstrated the 
apparent identity between common and natural law”); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES 
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977) (analyzing the 
development of anti-slavery constitutionalism from “nontechnical, popular origins that 
lay[ed] outside courts and legislatures”). 
265. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 passim 
(1908) (discussing hostility by common law advocates for legislation promoting social 
change); see also  PURCELL, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 141, at 189–90 
(examining how the federal common law, as well as notions of general versus local law, 
permitted conservative judges to thwart social legislation). 
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choice to expand or constrict federal common law.266  The Court now 
axiomatically parrots that no federal common law exists except in a few 
instances—where it exists.  In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials,267 for instance, the Court observed: 
Rather, absent some congressional authorization to formulate 
substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in 
such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and 
obligations of the United States, interstate and international 
disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our 
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.  In these 
instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy to be 
resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties 
of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or 
because the interstate or international nature of the controversy 
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.268 
The difficulty with the Texas Industries language is that the 
exception arguably swallows the rule: in a mobile society, or because 
interests other than purely local interests are often at stake, the Court is 
free to decide what types of disputes are “interstate” whose “nature” 
makes it “appropriate” to fashion a federal rule, and the only issue then 
is whether it is limited by the Court’s clause addressing “conflicting 
rights of States.”  If it were so limited, then cases like American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut would not even present a facially valid cause 
of action.  And merely suggesting a federal common law for “interstate” 
 
266. While I agree with most of Martin Redish’s comments, it seems too pedantic to 
suggest as he does that the inquiry is “first and foremost, a matter of statutory construction” 
of the Rules of Decision Act.  Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, 
and the Interpretative Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 768 
(1989).  Redish himself even admits that structural political values are “intertwined” with an 
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.  Id.  And it seems somewhat myopic to elevate 
the Rules of Decision Act in the debate when the statute is subject to congressional 
alteration. 
267. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
268. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).  The Court similarly stated: 
There is, of course, “no federal common law.”  Nevertheless, the Court has 
recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come 
to be known as “federal common law.”  These instances are “few and restricted,” 
and fall into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is 
“necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” and those in which Congress has 
given the courts the power to develop substantive law. 
Id. at 640 (citations omitted). 
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disputes overlooks the considerable history surrounding the relevant 
cases, discussed in this article, where the Court principally focused on 
the scope of its original jurisdiction rather than on establishing a theory 
for a federal common law.  Also, a few years after Texas Industries, the 
Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. observed that federal 
common law would displace state law whenever unique federal interests 
are at stake.269  But again, unless uniquely federal interests are limited to 
“the rights and obligations of the United States,”270 the concept arguably 
lacks ex ante discernable limits.  Locating those limits remains clouded 
by vague language and a meager dialogue on when a federal court can 
create a federally enforceable cause of action.271 
At the outset, we should distinguish truly federal common law 
causes of action from the judiciary’s role of filling in the interstices of 
federal statutes, or of establishing procedural rules.272  When courts 
interpret or imply rights or remedies not expressly contained in federal 
or constitutional provisions, they are not purporting to create a federal 
common law per se.273  They are deciding that the legislature or founders 
 
269. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[A] few areas, involving 
‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by 
federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-
called ‘federal common law.’”  (citation omitted)). 
270. Texas Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. 
271. Justice Brandeis’ curious language in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek 
Ditch Co., decided the same term as Erie, is illustrative.  304 U.S. 92 (1938).  The issue in 
Hinderlider involved the scope of the Compact Clause, and the states’ ability to use the clause 
to allocate a common resource; in dicta, unnecessary to any of the issues in the case, Brandies 
suggests toward the end of the opinion that interstate water disputes are governed by a 
“federal common law,” referring oddly to Kansas v. Colorado and other cases where the 
Court was more careful in its language.  Id. at 110.  
272. See Redish, supra note 266, at 788–89 (describing how statutory interpretation is 
fundamentally different than common law creation).  Some academics, however, have 
suggested that there is little difference between interpreting statutes and creating a common 
law.  Field, supra note 11, at 890–94.  Caleb Nelson comprehensively reviews the cases to 
illustrate how the courts apply a cabined general law, informed by ex ante general rules.  
Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006). 
273. Some of the 1970’s scholarship unfortunately conflated “truly” federal common law 
power with the ability of the Court to formulate pre-emptive federal rules of decision, when 
the Court otherwise unquestionably had jurisdiction to decide the controversy. E.g., Henry P. 
Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1975).  
Professor Monaghan, for instance, treated interpreting the Constitution as somehow 
equivalent to interpreting statutes, and then described the resulting process as a constitutional 
common law.  Id. at 13.  That Monaghan embraced an overly expansive understanding of 
“common law” is evident when he asserts that the Court’s gloss on administrative agencies 
 
10 KALEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:23 PM 
574 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:517 
intended or would have intended that the provision be applied in a 
certain fashion.274  When courts interpret statutes, or even add judicially 
created elements to statutory regimes, the process and sources the court 
invokes as authority to legitimize its decision are quite different from 
the process and sources that surface when creating a “common law” 
obligation or right.275  Too much commentary unfortunately overlooks 
this simple point and the concomitant fact that our judicial process is an 
adversary one; when we talk about a federal common law we necessarily 
are talking about opposing parties arguing about the merits of creating a 
cause of action, not interpreting existing sources. 
Next, we should separately identify circumstances where courts must 
develop a federal rule (whether incorporating a state rule or not) 
because of some federal involvement in a case.  For the most part, these 
instances reflect what Judge Friendly praised as the new federal 
common law.276  For example, when the United States enters the 
 
under the Administrative Procedure Act constitutes a “limited common law.”  Id. at 35 n.179.  
These are all incidents of the judiciary’s recognition that the language of any particular text 
(constitutional or statutory) often requires interpretation, or application in specific contexts, 
and the result Monaghan labels perhaps too cavalierly as federal common law.  Cf. Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (interpreting the Constitution as applying 
implicit federal rules governing foreign affairs).  Field shares an equally broad view of the 
concept.  Field, supra note 11, at 893–95.  Others since appear to acknowledge the difference, 
but with little significance.  E.g., Clark, supra note 260, at 1248. 
274. Texas Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 639 (“Our focus, as it is in any case involving the 
implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress.”).  In the antitrust arena, for 
instance, courts are not creating federal common law, but rather implementing Congress’ 
direction for the judiciary to fashion rules of decision.  E.g., id. (declining to permit 
contribution actions under antitrust laws); see Redish, supra note 266, at 789–90; see also 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (delegating to federal courts 
authority in the labor arena).  The same is true for the Court’s use of the common law to help 
fashion the broadly worded Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq (2006).  See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613 (2009) (incorporating joint and several liability 
from the common law); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (incorporating general 
principles of corporate law).  And even in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, where 
the Court held that the tribe could pursue a federal common law claim for loss of aboriginal 
rights, the reason is not because of the presence of federal common law, but rather because 
federal Indian relations are governed by federal law under the Constitution and aboriginal 
land rights originate from federal law.  470 U.S. 226, 234–36 (1985); see Oneida Indian Nation 
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974). 
275. See Monaghan, supra note 273, at 12 (noting inquiry into congressional purpose and 
sources being explored). 
276. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405–22 (1964).  Bradford Clark’s structural approach to federal common 
law essentially represents a modern application of Judge Friendly, with Clark suggesting that 
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economic marketplace by engaging in commercial transactions, 
including with its contractors, these transactions occur pursuant to 
federal law and policy.  By necessity, federal courts then must explore 
whether the United States’ interest warrants developing federal 
doctrines ancillary to these transactions or whether to apply ex ante state 
doctrines.  Many of the post-Erie allegedly federal common law cases 
fall into this category.  The seminal case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States, for instance, concluded that “[t]he rights and duties of the United 
States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal 
rather than local law.”277  In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., the 
Court held that a federal rule (albeit then incorporating a state rule) 
applies to liens in connection with federal loan programs. 278  In Howard 
v. Lyons, the Court crafted a federal privilege in a defamation action 
against a federal officer.279  And similarly, in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., the Court created a federal military contractor’s 
defense in state tort claims.280 
 
certain areas, including foreign affairs, are acutely federal issues under our constitutional 
structure.  Clark, supra note 260, at 1252.  The same is true with Martha Field’s analysis, with 
most of her examples instances of the judiciary employing a federally derived rule of decision 
when applying some ex ante statutory or constitutional directive.  Field, supra note 11, at 942 
(invoking Lincoln Mills).  Another normative “theory is that in certain areas, states have such 
a strong self-interest in a controversy or have erected such high barriers to political 
participation by some groups that state law cannot be expected to provide a sufficiently 
detached, reliable, and neutral rule of decision for a controversy.”  Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. 
Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 588 (2006). 
277. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).  The Court 
emphasized that “[t]he authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and 
statutes of the United States . . . .”  Id.  “The Clearfield doctrine has spread into many other 
types of litigation over obligations by or to the United States.”  Friendly, supra note 276, at 
409. 
278. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727–40 (1979). 
279. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959).  “The authority of a federal officer to 
act derives from federal sources, and the rule which recognizes a privilege under appropriate 
circumstances as to statements made in the course of duty is one designed to promote the 
effective functioning of the Federal Government.”  Id. 
280. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512–13 (1988); see also Farmers Educ. 
& Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 
(1940); Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).  Even when courts must 
fill the interstices of federal statutory programs, Philip Weiser advocates that “federal courts 
should treat pleas for a rule of federal common law to advance the interests of uniformity 
with care and skepticism, doing so only where the requested effort relates closely to a clearly 
articulated statutory or constitutional policy.”  Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, 
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 
1711 (2001). 
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These and other similar cases are all tethered somehow to the 
Constitution, statutes, or federal activities.  Even had the ardent 
Federalists been successful in securing a federal common law for crimes, 
it too would have been as a consequence of an expanded understanding 
of protecting constitutionally assigned federal interests.  Consequently, 
further exploration is necessary to decide whether the types of claims in 
Michigan v. Corps or American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ought 
to be permitted. 
A. Claims Against the United States 
Although this article’s principal objective is to elevate the 
conversation about the role, nature, and function of a federal common 
law—particularly in the environmental context—in lieu of advocating 
for any particular outcome, a federal common law claim against the 
United States seems particularly troublesome.  To begin with, as the 
Seventh Circuit noted, no modern court has examined sufficiently the 
viability of such a claim.281  And while the Seventh Circuit indicated that 
the parties—and derivatively the court—had only given the issue 
“cursory exposition,” the court proceeded to suggest that a “federal 
common law of public nuisance” exists and that “respectable 
arguments” support applying it to the federal agencies.282  But the court’s 
analysis overlooks the interplay of modern federal environmental laws 
and the APA.  And it overlooks that, in complex environmental cases, 
courts emphasize that they should respect “the strengths of agency 
processes on which Congress has placed its imprimatur.”283 
Cases against federal agencies seeking non-monetary relief occur 
routinely in the environmental and natural resource arena.284  When an 
agency’s action affects the environment, as the Corps did with allegedly 
allowing the transport of Asian carp, the agency must ensure that it has 
 
281. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2011). 
282. Id. at 773–74.  The court further concluded that Congress had not displaced the 
area by specifically addressing the precise issue of the interstate transport of Asian carp.  Id. 
at 776–80. 
283. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 305–06 (4th Cir. 2010). 
284. Cases seeking monetary relief are permissible under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2006); one prominent case involves deliberate agency decisions that 
parties claim precipitated environmentally destructive consequences.  See generally Edward 
Richards, The Hurricane Katrina Levee Breach Litigation: Getting the First Geoengineering 
Liability Case Right, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 267 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.co
m/essays/2-2010/Richards.pdf (discussing tort litigation against the United States for the levee 
breach from Hurricane Katrina). 
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complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)285 and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), and that its actions are not otherwise 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.286  The goal of NEPA and 
these other programs is to ensure that agencies adequately examine the 
environmental consequences of their decisions, and otherwise do not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously based on the information before them.287  If an 
agency fails to act affirmatively to address environmental threats and 
Congress has required action, parties can force that agency’s hand.288  
And any federal action that likely constitutes a public nuisance can be 
measured against that standard, and the principal difference is that 
parties in a public nuisance suit can ignore the administrative process 
and record and try the case as if it were a regular civil lawsuit.289  Indeed, 
in Michigan v. Corps, the State challenged the action under the APA 
but included the common law count apparently because the Corps 
arguably had yet to complete its analysis and render a reviewable final 
agency action.290  Such a concern arguably animated the Court in 
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut to note that complex 
environmental issues requires consideration of competing concerns by 
the expert agencies, in the first instance, and then review by the 
judiciary.291 
The possibility that such claims against the United States could 
intrude into the administrative process is illustrated by the effort to 
create a federal common law public trust doctrine.  The plaintiffs in Alec 
L. v. Jackson292 argued that a federal common law “public trust” requires 
the government to undertake the necessary steps to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.293  In lieu of any significant debate about the presence of a 
 
285. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f (2006). 
286. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“The purposes . . . are: To declare a national policy which will 
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and . . . 
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the 
Nation . . . .”). 
288. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).  But absent an affirmative 
statutory directive, plaintiffs may confront the limits of Administrative Procedure Act review.  
See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004). 
289. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
290.  See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
291. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). 
292. Alec L. v. Jackson, No. 1:11-CV-02235, 2012 WL 1951969, at *2 (D.D.C. May 31, 
2012). 
293. In seeking a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs argued: 
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federal common law,294 the plaintiffs instead marshaled a considerable 
array of sources that, for the most part, address the public trust doctrine 
at the state level.295  And while the plaintiffs professed that their claim 
did not ask the court to make policy, one is hard-pressed to read their 
complaint and pleadings without concluding otherwise.  The court 
recognized as much in dismissing the case, observing that the lawsuit 
would require determinations better suited to federal agencies and that 
“if Plaintiffs allege a public trust claim that could be construed as 
sounding in federal common law, the Court finds that the cause of 
action is displaced by the Clean Air Act.”296 
 
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, our federal government has an unalienable duty to 
protect essential natural resources as a public trust.  An atmospheric emergency 
threatens these natural resources.  Because of the urgent need for action, and 
consistent with its obligation under the Public Trust Doctrine, our federal 
government must protect our Country’s natural resources by developing a Climate 
Recovery Plan setting forth the means to implement the necessary emissions 
reductions by January 1, 2013. 
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 1, Alec L. v. Jackson, 2012 WL 1951969 (D.D.C. 
2012) (No. 11-CV-02235). 
294. Indeed, as the United States notes, plaintiffs only invoked the court’s jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief para. 21, Alec L. v. 
Jackson, 2012 WL 1951969 (D.D.C. May 31, 2012) (No. 11-CV-002235), and failed to pair 
federal question jurisdiction with a waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA.  
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11, Alec L. v. Jackson, 2012 
WL 1951969 (D.D.C. May 31, 2012) (No. 11-CV-02235).  But the United States perhaps 
inappropriately argued that this is an appropriate 12(b)(1) motion aimed at lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  See Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that an 
appropriate argument is failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) rather than lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1)).  The atypical nature of the Complaint is illustrated by its 
early passage that it “seeks to investigate the effectiveness of federal authorities in planning 
and managing our nation’s response to human-induced global energy imbalance.”  Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra, para 16. 
295. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, supra note 293, at 11–12 (citing 
Robert Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for the 
Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Geockel, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 861 (2007); Douglas 
L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central Railroad, 
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (2001); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land 
Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980); Wood, supra note 21).  The plaintiffs relied upon 
three cases, City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards, 635 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United 
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981); and In re Complaint of Steuart 
Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).  
296. Alec L. v. Jackson, 2012 WL 1951969, at *5. 
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B. Claims Against Non-Governmental Entities 
The suggestion that federal courts are institutionally and 
constitutionally capable of developing federal common law torts for 
interstate pollution presents an array of unresolved issues.  My primary 
objective here is to identify these issues and prompt a critical dialogue 
about how the law in this area ought to evolve, not necessarily to suggest 
definitively any recommended resolution.  But preliminarily, before 
academics encourage or courts adopt laudable ends in particular cases, 
considerably more attention must be paid to the jurisdictional and 
jurisprudential consequences of employing the federal judiciary as an 
acceptable means.  Jurisdiction is perhaps the most natural initial 
inquiry.  Unless plaintiffs can establish diversity jurisdiction,297 they must 
rely upon federal question jurisdiction.298  Should, however, a federal 
common law tort qualify for federal question jurisdiction?  This seems 
problematic.  To date, the issue has been averted in most of the cases, 
because jurisdiction otherwise existed.299  The interstate pollution cases, 
as noted in Part III, focused on the character of the parties, rather than 
the claims.300  Indeed, in today’s parlance, unless an alleged claim 
involves a matter equivalent to a constitutional tort (or right) or 
implicates a constitutional penumbra, during the antebellum period it 
generally would have been insufficient to confer on a federal court 
 
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
298. Id. § 1331. 
299. A vital difference exists between (a) a court’s decision to create a common law 
claim and employ that as a basis for asserting jurisdiction; and (b) Congress’ decision 
conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts and an explicit or implied authority to employ 
common law principles.  The majority of modern purportedly federal common law claims 
involve the latter, not the former.  See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959); 
Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959) (federal common law 
immunity to protect a federal policy as expressed by congress); Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) 
(a federal question, because the statute granted federal court jurisdiction, and federal 
corporation brought suit under the statute). One area specifically assigned to the federal 
judiciary is admiralty jurisdiction.  See David Currie, Federalism and Admiralty: “The Devil’s 
Own Mess,” 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 158 (1960).  And while the Radcliff Court referenced 
admiralty as a federal common law area, 451 U.S. at 642, that is perhaps misleading because 
the Constitution assigns the area exclusively to the federal judiciary; therefore, by default the 
federal judiciary must employ principles that the federal judiciary itself creates, unless 
otherwise directed by Congress.  See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 
(1920); cf. Amar, supra note 228, at 1525 (noting the differences between admiralty and 
common law); Redish, supra note 266, at 795 (“It is interesting to note, however, the many 
examples of existing ‘federal common law’ doctrine” cases are not true common law cases). 
300. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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federal question jurisdiction.301  And Justice Douglas’ lone abbreviated 
analysis in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee simply declared that jurisdiction 
exists without any real support or meaningful inquiry into its 
consequences.302 
Several practical problems surface if one allows a federal common 
law claim to serve as the basis for jurisdiction, and the Supremacy 
Clause possibly preempts any otherwise inconsistent state law claims.  
To begin with, such claims are likely to provoke both a 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.303  A court will be forced to decide, in 
advance of discovery, whether abstractly the complaint presents 
sufficient facts warranting the development of an inchoate federal 
common law tort.  The court might search for uniform principles 
permeating modern tort (nuisance) law, as embodied in the 
Restatement, much like Justice Story believed in a uniform general 
commercial law.304  Or, the court might focus exclusively on the Court’s 
interstate pollution cases, but those cases reflected the Court’s struggle 
with its original jurisdiction and exercise of its constitutionally assigned 
“equity” power to resolve disputes assigned to the Court.305  And, if 
those cases are expanded and applied to private disputes, is that 
sufficient continuity with the past, or is an abrupt departure and 
expansion appropriate?  And, if instead, the court delays deciding until 
after discovery and on a motion for summary judgment, is that fair to 
either party and how will they know what facts to adduce that might 
sway the court either way? 
Coupled with these pragmatic concerns are important 
jurisprudential considerations.  Federalism, for instance, oddly enough 
 
301. Jay indicates that “[i]t was well established that an issue of general common law 
presented no federal question for purposes of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,” at least until 
the later part of the 1800s.  Jay, supra note 74, at 1274 n.220, 1282.  But Jay overlooks that the 
opinions in the late 1800s were not premised on a general common law, but rather on a 
constitutional right to engage in interstate commerce, a federal question that undoubtedly 
arises under the Constitution.  See Kalen, supra note 163, at 456.  Field suggests that federal 
question jurisdiction may exist, but she barely mentions the issue and overlooks that the cases 
involving a constitutional issue are necessarily federal questions, quite a different issue than a 
true federal common law claim.  Field, supra note 11, at 898–99. 
302. See supra notes 253–56 and accompany discussion. 
303. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6). 
304. See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text.  Nelson suggests that courts do 
precisely that, by canvassing a “multitude of jurisdictions” to distill general or almost uniform 
rules.  Nelson, supra note 269, at 505.  But his analysis generally explores areas where either 
the Constitution or Congress requires federal court adjudication without sufficient guidance. 
305. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
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not only serves as the most commonly expressed justification for a 
federal common law, it surfaces equally as a dominant rationale for 
limiting the doctrine.  The republic’s early advocates for a federal 
common law for crimes emphasized the national (or Federal) interest in 
protecting the new Federal government; states in the new federal system 
could not be trusted to protect the national rather than local interest.306  
This fear of local interests trumping national interests surfaced in Swift, 
it infected the Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause throughout 
the nineteenth century, and today it arguably influences preemption 
analyses. 
But federalism conversely suggests caution before expanding the 
federal common law.307  Erie itself “plainly rests on federalism” and 
preserving the prerogatives of the states rather than on any other 
consideration.308  George Brown warns that an expansion of federal 
common law could vastly transform “the allocation of lawmaking roles 
between state and nation,” by having federal common law operate 
under the supremacy clause as binding on states.309  That is true, but only 
to a point.  It is unlikely that federal common law will ever become too 
pervasive. 
Separation of powers is yet another salient consideration when 
federal courts are asked to craft rules defining the rights and obligations 
of parties, rather than to apply ex ante rules.  With that said, any 
“general theory of separation of powers,” in the words of Professor Jack 
Beermann, “has proven elusive.”310  The doctrine embodies the 
 
306. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
307. See Redish, supra note 266, at 792. 
308. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The 
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 893 (1991); see also   
Clark, supra note 260, at 1259, 1273 (noting that judicial federalism operates stronger than 
congressional federalism due to the absence of political safeguards for the federal judiciary). 
309. George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in 
Private Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 235 (1992).  Clark 
responds to Brown by noting that certain areas of the federal common law are necessarily 
federal rules derived from our constitutional structure, and as such do not raise federalism 
concerns.  Clark, supra note 260, at 1253. 
310. Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 472 (2011).  Others question how a separation of powers analysis has 
any force if the doctrine failed to inhibit the development of state common law.  See Larry 
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 279 (1992).  
Kramer suggests “we must formulate our own solution to the problem of federal common law 
and separation of powers,” and decide whether it will improve the quality of government—he 
suggests if it can be tied to a federal statute.  Id. at 285–86. 
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structural and procedural safeguards in the Constitution, assigning 
certain functions to particular branches and creating a system of checks 
and balances.  “When the Constitution assigns a function to a particular 
branch of government, only that official may perform that function.”311  
Although recognizing that what constitutes “legislative power” is 
ambiguous, Thomas Merrill argues that federal courts lack the “power 
to ‘make law’ in a discretionary fashion.”312  He acknowledges that the 
framers of the Constitution provided little gloss on whether the judicial 
power included the power to decide cases under the common law.313  
This, after all, is reflected by the early debate over a federal common 
law of crime.314  But the various constitutional provisions aggregated, 
coupled with the strong language in Marbury v. Madison315 that ours is a 
government based upon written law, all suggest to Merrill that federal 
courts lack law-making power.316  He bolsters this analysis by observing 
that many of the early colonies specifically delegated to the state courts 
the power to employ the common law, and similarly federal statutes 
delegated to the federal courts the authority to decide and—by 
implication—create rules of decision for maritime and admiralty 
matters.317  Yet, Professor Louis Weinberg counters that at least two of 
the three spheres are co-extensive, such that the judiciary possesses the 
scope of authority vested in the legislative branch—at least until the 
legislative branch affirmatively acts.318  Professor Martha Field shares an 
equally expansive view, at least as long as the judiciary is left with 
sufficient discretion and can rely upon some authorization for its 
exercise of that discretion.319  This dialogue unfortunately conflates law 
 
311. Beermann, supra note 310, at 510. 
312. Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 335 (1992). 
313. Id. at 336. 
314. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
315. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
316. Merrill, supra note 312, at 338–39. 
317. Id. at 346–48. 
318. See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 11; Weinberg, Rules of Decision 
Act, supra note 11; cf. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) (disagreeing “that any time Congress could validly displace 
state law, the federal courts are constitutionally equally empowered to do so”).  The Court 
rejects this co-extensive theory.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 
(2011) (“[T]he Court remains mindful that it does not have creative power akin to that vested 
in Congress”). 
319. Field, supra note 11, at 887, 911–12.  Field’s canvass of then existing scholarship 
suggested “little analysis of the boundaries of courts’ power to make federal common law.  
Commentators typically simply list areas in which federal common law is acceptable without 
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with legislation and overlooks that judges simply cannot “legislate.”320 
Also, any meaningful separation-of-powers analysis is influenced by 
what political theory one endorses.  After all, attempting to apply any 
mechanistic legal theory about whether judges “legislate” or “find” the 
law harkens back to a bygone era.  At the state level, where separation 
of powers issues surface as well, judges unquestioningly have made—
that is judicially pronounced—law for over two centuries.  Whether 
today, in our age of statutes,321 federal judges may announce legal norms 
necessitates exploring how one perceives the respective capacity of the 
legislative or judicial branches to develop rules governing the rights and 
obligations of parties.322  Public choice theory, for instance, portrays the 
 
providing any animating principle to unify the categories.”  Id. at 886.  Although Clark uses 
judicial federalism to explain Erie, he adds that when federal courts overstep their bounds 
they violate the Constitution’s separation of powers structure.  Clark, supra note 260, at 1262. 
320. Judges undoubtedly can render first order, legally effective and even binding 
statements, which constitute law.  See George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 
YALE L.J. 970, 977 (1981) (discussing positivist legal theory).  But that is quite different than 
legislation.  Brian Simpson aptly writes: 
The notion that the common law consists of rules which are the product of a series 
of acts of legislation (most untraceable) by judges (most of whose names are 
forgotten) cannot be made to work, if taken seriously, because common law rules 
enjoy whatever status they possess not because of the circumstances of their origin, 
but because of their continued reception.  Of course it is true that judges are 
voluntary agents, and the way in which they decide cases and the views they express 
in their opinions are what they choose to decide and express.  Their actions create 
precedents, but creating a precedent is not the same thing as laying down the law.  
The opinions they express possess in varying and uncertain degree authority, as do 
opinions expressed by learned writers: that is not to say the quality of being viewed 
as a good reason for saying that what they assert is correct.  But to express an 
authoritative opinion is not the same thing as to legislate, and there exists no context 
in which a judicial statement to the effect that this or that is law confers the status of 
law on the words uttered.  It is merely misleading to speak of judicial legislation. 
Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON 
LAW 14 (William Twining ed., 1986).  In his lucid account of the role of judges, Justice 
Cardozo arguably conflates the ability to “make law” with “legislation,” but he does so in part 
to draw analogies regarding the establishment of rules.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98–141 (1949).  
321. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
322. Professors Farber and Frickey pioneered this type of exploration in their 
scholarship.  See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Farber & Frickey, supra note 308, at 893; Daniel A. Farber 
& Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1987); 
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (1988).  But cf. Abner J. 
Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 169 
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legislative process as a rent-seeking forum with a myriad of self-
interested, greedy, rent-seekers that often produces either incoherent or 
corrupt decisions.  If so, the judiciary with distinctly opposing rent 
seekers battling for a particular decision might produce a more coherent 
or at least less corrupt decision.  Similarly, those (if any are left) who 
ascribe to modern civic republicanism might favor an expanded judicial 
function, with judges capable of discerning normative societal values.323  
But civic republicans conversely might favor a limited judicial role.  
They could perceive the legislative process as a legitimate and deliberate 
forum for producing winners and losers, with the winners somehow 
reflecting shared societal values.  Others suggest that legislative choices, 
including arguably even inaction, reflect a society’s moral fabric.324  The 
judiciary, then, must be cautious and circumscribed when deciding when 
to intercede and somehow stretch that fabric in a slightly new direction.  
Each of these considerations is prominently on display in dialogues 
involving constitutional principles, but they are absent from the present 
conversation about expanding the federal common law. 
And this dialogue ought to address whether the public at large will 
consider an expanded federal common law as being legitimate.325  
Legitimacy encompasses many facets.  Two of which are continuity with 
 
(1988) (questioning whether public choice theory relies on over generalizations).  Jim Rossi 
too has pioneered the accuracy of public choice theory in the energy area.  See Jim Rossi, The 
Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 379, 397–401, 404–28 (2009); see also Mathew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public 
Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 137, 139 (2008) (arguing for civic republicanism over public choice theory at 
the local level). 
323. See Redish, supra note 266, at 777, 783.  Richard Stewart’s classic article notes law 
might embody common social values.  Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670–71 (1975); see also Hope M. Babcock, 
Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical Support for Making Individuals More 
Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 515, 519–20 
(2009) (“Civic republicans see the practice of politics as a ‘process in which private-regarding 
‘men’ become public-regarding citizens and thus members of a people.’  [It is about] the 
capacity of citizens to share in the act of governing, which requires citizens who can 
‘transcend[] narrow self-interest’ and think and act with a view toward the common good of 
their larger community.”).  See generally Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic 
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993) (surveying modern civic republicanism and 
illustrating its problems); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 
(1988). 
324. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 308. 
325. See Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for 
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 132 (1985) (discussing aspects of legitimacy). 
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the past and competence to decide when to depart from that past.  The 
common law of today holds no mystical value, and merely repeating the 
past because it somehow reflects a “higher law” is untenable.326  So too, 
it is a mistake to repeat past refrains without an appreciation for the 
process and surrounding “baggage” of that past.327  Stewart Jay aptly 
observes, “[e]very judicial opinion is itself a political act, an exercise of 
power.  A process of justification is involved, and the use of the past is 
always directed toward the resolution of a current controversy.”328  But 
the past as a justification for resolving a seemingly different present 
controversy requires not only deciding whether past precedent creates 
expectations for parties in adjusting their behavior, but it also engenders 
a critical inquiry into the rationale underlying past decisions.  Law, after 
all, in the words of Lon Fuller is “the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules.”329  For rules to garner legitimacy, 
they ostensibly should be clear, not fluctuate too quickly, be accessible 
to the public, and except in unusual instances be prospective.330  Only 
through sufficient continuity with past precedent, then, can that occur 
with the common law.331  And whether that is true today as litigants 
press the courts with federal common law public nuisance claims 
requires careful scrutiny and possibly a normative judgment. 
 
326. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
327. See Jay, supra note 74, at 1302, 1305, 1323. 
328. Id. at 1302. 
329. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (rev. ed. 1969). 
330. Id. at 39, 46–90; see also Jeremy Waldron, Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom or 
Fidelity?, 13 LAW & PHIL. 259 (1994).  And if law merely directs human behavior and must be 
obeyed because of that, then the law must afford sufficient notice to influence conduct.  See 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213–18 (1979). 
331. Llewellyn, supra note 136, at 106.   
The absolutely new, either in law or in science, is the absolutely anarchic and 
inscrutable.  Cases are new only as they deviate, in some respects but not all, from 
prior cases.  In terms of law as official action, every case is new.  Every judicial 
decision is the decision of an individual case, different from all others.  But the rule 
of law which the judicial decision expresses is always general; it applies to a class of 
cases whose fact-categories are identical.  Many different judicial decisions may 
express one and the same rule of law. . . .  The law in discourse grows as new fact 
situations (existential) in individual cases require the judge to define new fact-
classes (conceptual) and to assimilate these new fact-categories to old legal 
formulations in order to express the rule of his decision of the case at hand.  A new 
proposition of law is new only in the sense that it has been discovered for the first 
time, but it must always be and have been the logical consequence of one or another 
legal doctrine. 
Id. 
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Perceived or actual competence also plays a significant role in 
deciding whether a particular forum is institutionally capable of 
developing policy.  Often, the political question doctrine mistakenly is 
conflated with competence, and unfortunately the doctrine emerged 
inappropriately in the GHG public nuisance litigation.332  A group of law 
professors from around the country made this point in their amicus brief 
to the Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.333  
The political question doctrine bars the judiciary from adjudicating 
certain disputes.334  It can do so, in certain instances, when the 
Constitution assigns responsibility to another branch, when judicial 
interference might create conflicting directives with other branches, 
when the judiciary cannot “discover” manageable standards for 
resolving the dispute, when resolution requires initially some non-
judicial policy determination, or when respect to some prior political 
 
332. See generally Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine’s Role in Climate 
Change Nuisance Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11229 (2010) (questioning application of the doctrine); Philip Weinberg, “Political 
Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 
(2008) (same).  But see Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Dominic Lanza, Global Warming Tort 
Litigation: The Real “Public Nuisance,” 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 80 (2008) (arguing that 
political question doctrine is applicable in global warming cases). Others suggest that 
doctrines such as political question, along with standing, provide jurists with principled 
grounds for avoiding decisions in these cases.  E.g., Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and 
the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 
201 (2011) (arguing that public litigation model ill-suited for complex tort-based cases). 
333. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, 4, 8–9, 
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174). 
334. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224, 228–29 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962).  See generally PHILIPPA 
STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND “POLITICAL QUESTIONS”: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
EVASION (1974); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Jesse 
H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1461–63 
(2005); Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); 
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031 
(1985); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: A Functional 
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of 
Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2002).  The doctrine’s roots emanate from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (noting certain questions are political), and then more significantly 
from resolution of the Dorr Rebellion and the ability of the Court to apply the Guarantee 
Clause in the Constitution, in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).  See MARVIN E. 
GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION, A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADICALISM: 1833–1849 
(1973). 
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decision counsels against judicial interference.335  These all might serve 
as legitimate considerations that a court can weigh when deciding 
whether to establish a federal liability scheme, but it would be a mistake 
to have these considerations obfuscated under the rubric of the political 
question doctrine.  The idea of “discovering” manageable standards is 
anachronistic: Whether to create a liability regime cannot be answered 
by a circular inquiry into whether an ex ante standard exists.  Whether, 
also, the Constitution assigns the issue to another coordinate political 
branch is the ultimate separation of powers question, not something 
capable of being decided abstractly.  Perhaps the only meaningful 
political question inquiry is whether judicial intervention intrudes into 
the political process, by interfering with another branches’ decision or 
the need for another branch to render an initial policy decision.  But 
that issue effectively is whether the issue has been displaced by another 
coordinate branch.336  And that is how the Court decided American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.337 
The critical challenge for proponents of an expanded federal 
common law might be the perceived competence of having the judiciary 
develop doctrinal rules governing the rights and obligations of parties in 
a complex area such as greenhouse gas emissions.  After all, the judicial 
process operates within an adversarial structure, where the goal is 
neither “truth” nor “objective fact.”338  A while ago, in the well-known 
case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,339 Judge Bergan commented that 
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights 
of parties before it.  Its decision of private controversies may 
sometimes greatly affect public issues.  Large questions of law 
are often resolved by the manner in which private litigation is 
 
335. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
336. This approach suggests that courts can consider such disputes until the issues 
become displaced.  See Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches 
to Climate Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1576 (2007). 
337. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  A number of law professors argued to 
the contrary in their amicus brief to the Court.  Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae In 
Support of Respondents, supra note 333.  In reaching its judgment, the Court declined to 
address whether this displacement theory suggested that state common law claims might be 
preempted.  For an excellent analysis of the issue in the context of the Clean Water Act, see 
Glicksman, supra note 325. 
338. See Sidney Ulmer, Scientific Method and the Judicial Process, AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST, Dec. 1963, at 21, 22.  
339. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.1970). 
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decided.  But this is normally an incident to the court’s main 
function to settle controversy.  It is a rare exercise of judicial 
power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful 
mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the 
rights and interests before the court.340 
The GHG public nuisance litigation illustrates his point.  To the 
extent that plaintiffs in such cases seek some form of injunctive relief,341 
the ability of the court to fashion legitimate relief is constrained by the 
adversarial process.  The adversarial process shields the court from the 
complex modern regulatory state.  The court is insulated from state 
public utility commissions and their desire to ensure that utilities have 
sufficient capacity and reserve capacity for their loads; it is shielded 
from the contracts for the delivery of fuel to the facilities, from the 
power purchase agreements, from the role of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, from the regional transmission organizations 
and how removing the capacity of some generation facilities might affect 
reliability of the transmission grid.  In short, the court’s ability to 
appreciate and respond to the multi-faceted, interconnected, highly 
regulated energy grid is circumscribed. 
This is not to suggest that we should abandon an expanded federal 
common law.  An enlarged federal common law might serve an 
important jurisprudential function, particularly when the type of harm 
being caused by a defendant’s conduct is one that society generally 
recognizes is a tort, and it is a tort whose recognition and elements 
ought to be defined by the federal rather than state judiciary.  But 
whether we are at that stage with GHG emissions, invasive species, or 
potentially other interstate environmental threats, requires more than 
simply promoting the legitimacy of the ends.  It necessitates, in short, 
critically exploring the means.  And that requires balancing the 
continuity with the past and the societal demand for change.  That 
balance has yet to occur. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Strikingly, the evolution of American law displays the inherent 
 
340. Id. at 871. 
341. If plaintiffs seek damages, that presents the same problem in Boomer: Private 
litigation typically addresses individual harms, not the overall public good: And judicial relief 
often accepts compensated environmental damage—to the extent plaintiffs can even trace the 
particular conduct to specific individual harm. 
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difficulty of resorting to the past while ensuring enough flexibility to 
adapt to new circumstances.  “It is,” therefore, “the duty of the student 
of political habits and customs to trace the elements of continuity in 
those customs that appear to be new, and the elements of change 
beneath the appearance of their continuity.”342  The revolutionary period 
witnessed the tension between the need for change, while preserving 
aspects of a past, customary heritage that protected ex ante expectations 
and basic liberties.  Just as during the clash between Blackstone and 
Bentham, with the latter denouncing the former “as an enemy of reform 
whose sophistry was so perverse as to be almost a crime,”343 we today 
still confront historic moments that test whether to weave change into 
the fabric of our customary, unwritten law.  “If,” as J.G.A. Pocock wrote 
when discussing historical English legal thought, “the idea that law is 
custom implies anything, it is that law is in constant change and 
adaptation, altered to meet each new experience in the life of the 
people . . . .”344  Yet law’s amenability for change is hindered by the 
conservative nature of the legal tradition; it typically looks backward 
rather than ahead; it often becomes disassociated from present societal 
values; and it generally is molded by a society’s legal elite.345  But, as Sir 
Frederick Pollock championed so long ago, the common law is where 
modern experience can reflect modern values.346 
The question, then, is whether we are at that point. 
 
342. RODICK, supra note 2, at 132. 
343. FREDERICK POLLOCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF 
POLITICS 102 (Rev’d & Repub. ed. 1960) (1890). 
344. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY 
OF THE HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 36 (1957). 
345. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 116–19 (1985). 
346. See COSGROVE, supra note 125, at 151. 
